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ABSTRACT 
The aim of this study was to evaluate the importance of good governance to the flow of foreign 
development aid. The researcher used the sub-Saharan Africa region to accomplish the aim of his study. 
The study examined the extent to which foreign development aid has been targeted at countries with 
sound governance systems, that is, strong institutions and policies. This study therefore determined 
whether the flow of foreign development aid in sub-Saharan African developing countries has changed 
since the endorsement of the “Monterrey Consensus” by targeting those countries with sound economic 
institutions and policy environments.  
 
Empirical and theoretical literature was reviewed on foreign development aid as well as governance 
systems especially the Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG), which was discussed and used in 
this study as the governance indicator system. The study’s results and findings were deduced from 
secondary data which addressed the governance indicators in sub-Saharan Africa for 2010 to 2015, 
gathered from the IIAG assessment reports of 12 selected sub-Saharan African countries as well as the 
amount of foreign development aid received by each of the countries during the same period gathered 
from OECD and World Bank statistics.  
 
Additionally, inferential analysis was undertaken using the Spearman’s correlation test as well as a 
multiple linear regression analysis to establish the relationships and/or impact of the governance 
indicators on the flow of foreign development aid to sub-Saharan Africa. The study concluded that the 
combined effect of all the governance indicators have a statistical significant effect on the flow of 
foreign development aid to developing countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Individually, Participation and 
Human Rights indicators as well as Sustainable Economic Opportunities indicators have a positive 
effect or impact on the flow of foreign development aid in sub-Saharan African countries, with 
Sustainable Economic Opportunities indicators having the highest impact.  
 
However, Safety and Rule of Law indicators were discovered to have a negative effect on the flow of 
foreign development aid in sub-Saharan Africa whilst Human Development indicators were discovered 
not to have any effect or impact. On the other hand, the study also noted that in further determining 
allocations funding agencies may consider a country’s Safety and Rule of Law indicators as well as 
Human Development indicators whilst Participation and Human Rights indicators and Sustainable 
Economic Opportunity indicators were seen not have any significant effect on determination of funding 
allocations. 
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1.1 Background to the study  
Official Development Assistance (ODA) or foreign development aid plays a significant role in 
complementing other sources of financing for development (Dollar and Levine, 2006). A study 
carried out by the World Bank dubbed “Assessing Aid” (1998), argued that foreign aid would 
have greater impact on poverty reduction if it was targeted on the poorest countries and among 
them those with strong economic institutions and policies. The “Monterrey Consensus” which 
was derived from the United Nations Conference on Financing for Development held in Mexico 
in 2002, concluded that developing countries’ own institutions and policies are key in ensuring 
sustainable development and that sound policies and good governance at all levels of 
government are fundamental in ensuring ODA effectiveness (United Nations, 2002) 
 
Several types of evidence have been derived to prove that effectiveness of foreign development 
aid is influenced by the recipient country’s economic institutions and policies. This is evidenced 
by several country examples where the existence of sound institutions and policies have 
produced good results. According to a study carried out by Dollar and Levine (2006), the 
Marshall Plan is one famous example and other examples include South Korea (1960’s -
1970’s), China (1980’s) as well as Uganda and Vietnam (1990’s). Studies carried out have also 
proven that development projects tend to succeed more in jurisdictions where there are sound 
institutions and policy environments as opposed to those with weak institutions and policies 
(Kaufmann et. al., 1999; Dollar and Levin, 2005).  
 
Dollar and Levine (2005) considered the effect of political institutions and they determined the 
relationship that exists between democracy and project outcomes and concluded that structural 
adjustment loans were more successful in democracies than they are in autocratic governments. 
Burnside and Dollar (2000) found that there is an indirect relationship between foreign aid and 
growth hence it is difficult to argue that foreign aid works the same in all institutional/policy 
environments. However, they also found that growth is correlated to the interaction of foreign 
aid and an index of institutions and policies. According to Dollar and Levine (2006), this 
interaction is consistent with the argument that the effectiveness of foreign aid resources 
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significantly depends of the recipient country’s institutions and policies. There is, however, an 
ongoing debate regarding these different theories.  
     
As opposed to the Dollar and Levin (2006) study, which has considered separately the impact 
of the institutional selectivity and poverty indices in determining the level of allocation for 
foreign aid by donors, this study will consider the impact of the overall country’s quality of 
governance to the actual flow of foreign development aid with specific focus on countries in 
the sub-Saharan African region.  
 
The study builds on the existing literature on how aid allocations are influenced by the 
soundness of a country’s economic institutions and policies. It explores the impact of the overall 
quality of governance system, as determined by the Ibrahim Index of African Governance 
(IIAG) annual assessments, to the flow of foreign development aid within sub-Saharan African 
developing countries.  The IIAG assesses governance under four main conceptual categories 
namely; safety and rule of law, participation and human rights, sustainable economic 
opportunity and human development. The study further analyses the effect of each of these 
indicators on the flow development aid to determine whether donors consider specific 
governance indicators when determining aid allocations for developing countries.  
 
According to Dollar and Levine (2006), most studies that have been carried out around this 
topic have either estimated a decision model for donor agencies using regression analysis 
(Maizels and Nissanke, 1984; McGillivray, 2004) or evaluate the actual disbursement patterns 
using indices based on some specific development criteria, such as income of recipients 
(McGillivray, 2000; Roodman, 2003a; White,1992). Dollar and Levine (2006) further 
combined the two schools of thought by constructing an index of a donor’s optimal aid 
allocation based on weighted measures of developmental criteria as well as the donor’s political 
and commercial interests and they evaluate each donor’s actual aid commitments with respect 
to the optimal aid allocation (Dollar and Levin, 2006).  
 
As opposed to this donor-oriented approach to foreign aid allocation, in this study focus will be 
on the actual patterns of foreign aid flows and examining that against the overall governance 
indices for each of the selected countries. A regression model will be used to determine the 
impact of governance on the flow of foreign aid to countries within the sub-Saharan Africa 
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region. Reference will be made to the governance indicators identified by the Ibrahim Index of 
African Governance (IIAG). 
 
1.2 Problem Statement 
Official development assistance (ODA) or foreign development aid seems to open hope for a 
better future for many developing countries and is therefore considered an essential source of 
development finance with the potential to turn around developing economies. As the rationale, 
by donors, for providing foreign aid evolves following the “Monterrey Consensus”, more funds 
are now being channelled to developing countries with the aim to reduce poverty and improve 
the quality of lives for people living in those countries.  
 
Post-September 11, the perspective of donor agencies on foreign development aid or ODA has 
changed significantly. In the past, foreign development aid was used to buy the “elites” and 
influence affairs in third world countries, for example during the Cold War era. The effects on 
development were considered secondary. According to Akramov (2006), this approach has 
since changed because of the increasing importance of developing countries to global security, 
for example, several developing countries in Asia and Africa have served as staging points for 
terrorist attacks. Industrialised countries have therefore realised the importance of cooperating 
with developing countries to ensure global security. They have also begun to understand that 
persistent poverty results in developing countries being vulnerable to security and other threats 
therefore the importance of foreign aid has increasingly shifted towards addressing the 
challenges of development (Akramov, 2006). 
  
Akramov (2006) links two contemporary views for the rationale of foreign aid – first, donor’s 
self-interests (political, strategic and economic) and second, the recipient needs (economic 
empowerment, poverty reduction, education, reduction of maternal and infant mortality, etc) – 
to come up with an enlightened view that the rationale of foreign aid is donor’s self-interests 
with the recognition that a world with less diseases and poverty and more educated people is 
likely to be more secure and stable creating opportunities for the rest of the world’s population.  
 
The United Nations (UN), in 2002, through the “Monterrey Consensus” further developed on 
this idea and identified that foreign aid is more effective if targeted on developing countries 
with sound institutions and economic policies (Dollar and Levine, 2006). Major donor agencies 
and countries to signed up to this consensus and agreed to use institutional capacity and strength 
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of economic policies as a basis for determining allocations for foreign development aid to 
developing countries.  
 
In determining the foreign aid allocations to the various developing countries, donor agencies 
often consider several factors including the strength of the recipient countries’ economic 
governance structures and policies. The scaling up of foreign development aid in most sub-
Saharan African countries also brings challenges to policy makers in governments of the 
recipient countries in coming up with policies that are more attractive to donors and ensuring 
that governance structures are robust and are attractive to foreign development aid. 
 
Through analysing selectivity models by donors, studies by Dollar and Levine (2006) sought 
to examine the extent to which foreign aid allocation by multilateral and bilateral donor 
agencies has considered poverty reduction but also targeting developing countries with sound 
institutions and governance structures. The studies concluded that the determinants of foreign 
aid allocation have evolved significantly over time. Besides targeting poor countries, the studies 
also concluded that multilateral donor agencies also consider the economic governance of 
recipient countries in determining foreign aid or ODA allocations (Dollar and Levine, 2006).   
Developing on these theories, this study seeks to further dissect the extent to which the strength 
of governance structures for developing countries in sub-Saharan Africa have contributed to 
the flow of foreign development aid in the years post the “Monterrey Consensus”. The study 
will focus on all the indicators of governance as determined by the IIAG, namely; safety and 
rule of law, participation and human rights, sustainable economic opportunity and human 
development (IIAG, 2016). Furthermore, using correlation testing, the study will also determine 
whether donors have specific preferences to each of these indicators when making the 
determination on how much development aid they can allocate to a developing nation. The 
study will specifically focus on countries within the sub-Saharan Africa region. 
 
1.3 Research Questions and Scope 
The study seeks to answer the following questions: 
 Is the overall governance quality rating important in determining the flow of foreign aid 
to developing countries in sub-Saharan Africa? 
 What impact does each of the governance indicators have on the flow of foreign aid to 
developing nations in sub-Saharan Africa? 
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1.4 Objectives of the Research 
The purpose of this study is to determine whether the flow of foreign aid in selected Sub-
Saharan African developing countries has changed since the endorsement of the “Monterrey 
Consensus” by targeting those countries with sound economic institutions and policy 
environments. We will examine the extent to which foreign development aid has been targeted 
at countries with sound governance systems, that is, strong institutions and policies. Therefore, 
the following objectives shall guide this study: 
 To determine whether the overall governance quality rating is important in determining 
the flow of foreign aid to developing countries in sub-Saharan Africa; 
 To determine the impact each of the governance indicators have on the flow of foreign 
aid to developing nations in sub-Saharan Africa; and 
 
1.5 Significance of the Study 
As discussed earlier, previous studies have identified multiple factors as having influence on 
foreign aid allocation and its effectiveness and have concluded that donor agencies and 
especially multilateral agencies consider the governance structures for the recipient countries 
when determining the allocations to these countries. Most of the research has focused on the 
effectiveness of these in determining donor foreign aid allocation policies focusing on the major 
donor agencies without considering the overall impact of developing nations’ quality of 
governance systems on the overall flow of foreign aid.  Therefore, this study would be 
significant to the researcher as an interested stakeholder in the NGO sector. This is because it 
would assist him to understand the relationship of governance and the flow of foreign aid as 
well as how he can use that knowledge in his line of work. Furthermore, the results of this study 
would also contribute to the body of literature on the subject matters of governance and foreign 
aid flow especially in sub-Saharan Africa. This knowledge could assist policy makers as well 
as other strategic stakeholders in sub-Saharan Africa countries who would be seeking ways to 
improve the flow of foreign aid in their countries. The results of this study could also be used 
as a template by governments from various sub-Saharan Africa countries in improving their 
governance performance as well as were they should focus their attention when seeking an 
improvement in foreign aid flow at their countries. On the other, hand, this study could also 
assist donors intending to provide foreign aid to sub-Saharan Africa countries. They could use 
the findings from this study to provide them guidance. 
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1.6 Research Assumptions 
For the purposes of this dissertation, an assumption will be made that major donors have signed 
up to the “Monterrey Consensus” and have endorsed the idea that sound governance is key in 
ensuring that foreign development aid is used effectively. In this study, the simple hypothesis 
is that the governance structures for countries in sub-Saharan Africa play an indispensable role 
in the flow of foreign aid or ODA to these countries. The research will further apply some 
empirical analysis between the flow of foreign development aid and each of the four major 
governance indicators to try and place them on a ranking scale of importance. The null 
hypothesis will be rejected if there is no positive correlation between the governance structures, 
as determined by the IIAG, of developing nations in Sub-Saharan Africa to the amount of 
foreign aid that they receive on an annual basis. 
 
1.7 Organization of the Study  
The study was broken down into five chapters. The first chapter (Chapter 1) covered the 
introduction of the study, background of the study, problem statement, and significance of the 
study, research objectives, research questions, hypothesis, scope of the study as well as the 
dissertation structure. Chapter 2 captured the literature review related to the area under review 
in this study. Chapter 3 presented the methodology of the study, aspects on the study involved, 
the study sample, data collection methods and data analysis. Chapter 4 covered the results of 
the study and the discussion of the results thereof. Lastly, was Chapter 5 that focused on 









This chapter shall identify and examine what has been done by other scholars in relation to the 
topic. This literature review shall also assist the researcher in limiting the research problem as 
well as better defining it. This chapter shall also form a framework within which the findings 
of the research will be interpreted as well as to overcome the limitations from various previous 
studies. 
2.2 Definition and measurement of key variables 
2.2.1 Foreign Development Aid 
Hoy (1998) defines foreign development aid as the benevolent donation of funds by rich nations 
to poor nations so that the poor nations can sufficiently meet the needs of its people. The 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) defines foreign development aid as Official 
Development Assistance (ODA); this definition is considered as the technical definition of 
foreign aid. Foreign aid or ODA is a “transfer of resources on concessional terms (Akramov, 
2012) undertaken by official agencies; [which] has the promotion of economic development 
and welfare as its main objectives; and has a grant element’ of 25 percent or more” (Cassen, 
1994). The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) identifies 
foreign aid or ODA as consisting of official grants and loans from donor agencies (multilateral 




In their report on Sub-Saharan Africa, the World Bank described the crisis in the region as a 
“governance crisis” (World Bank, 1998). The World Bank (1998) defines governance as the 
way power is exercised in the management of a country’s social and economic resources for 
development. A good governance system sets out certain requirements on the process of public 
policy formulation and decision-making (Jensen, 2013). It therefore implies managing public 
affairs in an accountable, participatory, equitable and transparent manner. It also entails 
effective participation in the public policy-making process, prevalence of the rule of law and 
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an independent judiciary institutional checks and balances through horizontal and vertical 
separation of powers and effective oversight agencies (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton, 
1999). This study shall use the IIAG indicators of governance. 
 
a) Measurement of governance 
As indicated in the introduction, the main objective of this study is to examine how the 
allocation of foreign aid to developing countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, considers the quality 
of governance, based on the IIAG indicators of governance. According to the Mo Ibrahim 
Foundation (http://mo.ibrahim.foundation/iiag/), the IIAG provides an annual assessment of the 
quality of governance and performance of 48 countries in sub-Saharan Africa. The IIAG 
consists of 90 indicators built into fourteen sub-categories, four categories and one overall 
measurement of governance performance. The indicators include official data, expert 
assessments and citizen surveys provided by more than 30 independent global institutions and 
is considered the most comprehensive collection of data on African governance. 
 
According to Iqbal and Shah (2008) Professor Robert Rotberg, Dr Rachel Gisselquist and their 
team at the Kennedy School of Government of Harvard University are the producers of this 
index and Mo Ibrahim Foundation funds this project. The first index came out in 2007 when 
data for 2000, and 2002 and 2005 were also published to provide a benchmark. Compiled by 
combining more than 90 variables from more than 30 independent African and global 
institutions, the IIAG is the most comprehensive collection of data on governance in Africa. 
The IIAG provides a framework for citizens, governments, institutions and the private sector 
to accurately assess the supply of public goods and services and policy outcomes across the 
continent. In addition to it being a tool to help determine and discuss government performance, 
the IIAG is a decision-making tool to govern. 
 
The Foundation defines governance as the provision of political, social and economic assets 
that citizens have the right to expect from their state and that a state has the responsibility to 
provide to its citizens. The IIAG assesses progress in four main conceptual categories: security 
and the rule of law, participation and human rights, sustainable economic opportunities and 
human development. These four pillars are populated with data covering elements of 
governance ranging from infrastructure to freedom of expression and hygiene to property 
rights. The IIAG allows users to compare governance performance across a range of sizes at 
the national, regional and continental levels. Scores and classes are available for all years since 
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2000, which allows the analysis of temporal trends. All underlying data used in the construction 
of the IIAG are freely available and published in a transparent manner with a complete 
methodology. 
 
The Ibrahim Index has been used by civil society and government agencies across the continent 
to control governance. An example is in South Africa, where the opposition Democratic 
Alliance used the Ibrahim Index to challenge the government's record of security and safety 
(www.timeslive.co.za). Furthermore, the IIAG categories are composed of 14 subcategories 
composed of more than 100 indicators. The IIAG is calculated using data from more than 30 
independent sources. Annual improvements have been made to the IIAG, which may be 
methodological or based on the inclusion or exclusion of indicators. All IIAG data are then 
retrospectively reviewed in accordance with best practice. 
 
The IIAG assesses progress under four main conceptual categories namely: 
1) Safety and Rule of Law which captures the extent to which all individuals are protected 
from both internal and external threats to their peace. The degree to which society is 
safe and secure is assessed alongside the existence of a robust legal system and 
transparent, effective and accessible institutions within all branches of the state. There 
are 23 indicators in the Security and Rule of Law category and they are divided into 
four sub-categories: Rule of Law, Accountability, Personal Security and National 
Security. The rule of law subcategory includes five indicators of judicial process 
measurement, judicial independence, sanctions, the transfer of property rights and 
power. The liability subcategory includes seven indicators that measure accountability, 
transparency and corruption in the public sector, accountability, transparency and 
corruption in the rural sector, corruption and bureaucracy, liability of agents bribes in 
public offices and public offices, office abuses and misappropriation of public funds. 
The Personal Security sub-category includes six indicators that measure domestic 
political persecution, social unrest, personal security, police service reliability, violent 
crime, and human trafficking. The national security sub-category includes five 
indicators measuring cross-border tensions, government involvement in armed conflict, 
national armed conflict, political refugees and internally displaced persons. 
2) Participation and Human Rights which captures the relationship between government 
and citizens. It measures, on one hand, the extent to which individuals can participate 
in, and take ownership of, the political process and, on the other hand, the state’s 
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achievement in guaranteeing the political and social rights of all citizens. There are 19 
indicators in the Participation and Human Rights category and they are subdivided into 
three sub-categories: Participation, Rights and Gender. The subcategory of participation 
includes five indicators that measure free and fair elections, free and fair elections, 
political participation, electoral self-determination and effective government power. 
The rights subcategory includes seven indicators that measure international conventions 
on human rights, human rights, political rights, workers' rights, freedom of expression, 
freedom of association and meeting and civil liberties. The gender sub-category 
includes seven indicators that measure gender equality, primary gender budgeting and 
secondary education, women's participation in the labour force, equal representation in 
rural areas, women in parliament, women's rights and legislation on violence against 
women. 
3) Sustainable Economic Opportunity which captures whether the state provides the 
conditions necessary for the pursuit of economic opportunities that contribute to a 
prosperous and equitable society. It measures the delivery of sound economic policies 
and the provision of a sustainable economic environment that is conducive to 
investment and the operation of a business. There are 30 indicators in the sustainable 
economic opportunities category and they are divided into four subcategories: public 
management, business environment, infrastructure and rural sector. The public 
administration sub-category includes 11 indicators of statistical capacity, public 
administration, inflation, diversification, reserves, fiscal management, ratio of total 
revenues to total expenditures, tax policy, Foreign Debt Services for Exports, Revenue 
Collections and Bank Deafness. The Business Environment sub-category includes six 
indicators that measure the competitive environment, investment climate, investment 
climate for rural businesses, administrative and administrative burdens, and customs 
procedures. The infrastructure subcategory includes six indicators measuring 
electricity, roads, railways, air transport, telephone infrastructure and computing, as 
well as digital connectivity. The rural sub-category includes seven indicators measuring 
public resources for rural development and land and water for low-income rural 
populations, agricultural research and extension services, agricultural and agricultural 
commodity markets, policy framework and law for rural organizations, dialogue 
between government and organizations rural areas and the cost of agricultural policy. 
4) Human Development which captures the success of the state in securing the well-being 
of its citizens. It measures the extent to which the government provides citizens with 
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social protection, comprehensive education provision and a healthy life. There are 22 
indicators in the Human Development category and they are divided into three sub 
categories: well-being, health and education. The welfare sub-category includes nine 
indicators that measure the social protection system, social protection and employment, 
social exclusion, social protection services (health and education), equity of use of 
public resources, access to water, access to health services, environmental policy and 
environmental sustainability. The sub-category of education includes seven indicators 
measuring the training and quality of education, the quality of the education system, the 
ratio of pupils to primary school teachers, completion of the primary cycle, transition to 
secondary education, education and training. subscription to higher education and 
literacy. The health sub-category includes six indicators for measuring maternal 
mortality, infant mortality, vaccination, antiretroviral therapy, illness and malnutrition. 
(Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2016) 
 
The IIAG is designed to be a tool for citizens, governments, institutions and businesses to assess 
the supply of public goods and services and policy outcomes across Africa. It is an annual 
publication that receives important media information from across the African continent and 
international media (Iqbal and Shah, 2008). Although no one questions the validity of the 
index's ambitions, some researchers have questioned the effectiveness of the index and in 
particular the need for civil society to participate in its results, the point is that it there is often 
no one in Africa Civil society strong and effective (Knack, 2010; Iqbal and Shah, 2008). Others 
argue that this view does not consider the important role that civil society is beginning to play 
in African politics (Nardo et. al, 2005). Although the IIAG is complete, there are some major 
breakdowns triggered by the results. One example is the extremely high placement of some 
countries which are known to have poor political participation and registration of human rights 
whilst, have relatively high human development indicators. 
 
However, using these indicators, which have been proven to be more stable and are being used 
by almost all African countries in assessing the quality of their governance, the research will 
seek to determine how the allocation of foreign aid, to developing countries in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, is affected by the quality of the governance rating by the IIAG. 
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2.3 Relationship between Development Aid flows and good governance 
2.3.1 Theoretical Framework 
According to Akramov (2006) the review of the aid allocation literature suggests that donors 
seem to be neither entirely altruistic nor completely self-serving, that is, donors’ aid allocation 
aims to promote their own interests as well as oriented towards the needs of recipient countries. 
He adds that there are four factors which are believed to be key in determining the decisions of 
donors' aid allocation: 
 The needs of the recipient: He states that promotion of economic development as well 
as welfare appears crucial when making aid allocation decisions for most donors. 
 Donors' political and strategic interests: According to Akramov (2012) most of variation 
in the flows of aid can be due to the donors' strategic and politic interests according to 
the changing situations internationally. 
 Economic interests of the donors: The donors' economic interests also have a significant 
effect on the variation in aid flows as donors allocate aid in some cases due to a need to 
expand their own markets, protect their foreign investments or create cheap import 
sources from developing countries. 
 Svensson (2010) argues that there has been a recent drive by some donors to focus on 
good governance and allocation of more aid to countries with good performance on the 
various aspects of good governance.  
 
Therefore, the following observations were made upon review of literature on allocation of aid.  
Firstly, while most empirical studies do not explicitly present the theoretical model embodied 
in their regressions, it is possible to incorporate them into the theoretical framework proposed 
by Dudley and Montmarquette (1976) and later extended by Trumbull and Wall (1994). The 
model is based on the standard microeconomic theory of constrained utility maximization and 
tries to explain bilateral donors’ two decisions: first, whether or not to give aid to a given 
developing country (eligibility stage), and second, how much aid to grant given a positive 
decision had been made in first part (level stage). The model assumes that there are only two 
goods in donors’ utility function, that is, the impact of foreign aid and the other good. The donor 
maximizes the relative impact of its aid on the recipient country, as measured by the ratio of 
the per capita aid to the per capita income, weighed by the size of recipient’s population. The 
main assumptions of the model are that the donor country may expect that; 
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i. the recipient country will behave more favourably toward donor country by supporting 
donor’s national political interests;  
ii. the recipient country will confer economic benefits towards the donor by buying more 
of the products from the donor country; and  
iii. the lives of people in the recipient country will be better because of donor’s assistance 
(altruistic vision).  
While the first two assumptions refer to donor interests, the third assumption refers to recipient 
needs. By solving the utility maximization problem subject to budget constraint, Dudley and 
Montmarquette (1976) derive two econometric specifications to test the relative importance of 
various factors in donors’ aid allocation decisions. 
The model developed by Dudley and Montmarquette (1976) aimed to explain individual 
donor’s aid allocation decision assuming that different donors have different subjective 
measures of the impact of aid to a recipient country. Later Trumbull and Wall (1994) extended 
the model to allow optimization by multiple donors assuming that all donors have the same 
subjective measure of the impact of aid to a recipient country. In this model, similarly to Dudley 
and Montmarquette (1976), a donor maximizes the weighted sum of the total impacts of its 
official development assistance on all recipient’s subject to its aid budget. 
On the other hand, Alesina and Dollar (2010) control for both donor interests (mostly for 
strategic and political interests) using such variables as colonial experience, UN voting 
similarity, the share of Muslims and Roman Catholics in the recipients’ population and recipient 
needs through per capita income. They find considerable evidence that the allocation of bilateral 
foreign aid is mostly determined by political and strategic considerations, while at the margin, 
developing countries that support political rights and civil liberties receive more aid, ceteris 
paribus. 
2.3.2 Empirical findings 
There were several studies on the development aid flows as well as governance which the 
researcher shall use to establish the relationship between these two variables. A study by 
Apodaca and Stohl (2009), exploring U.S. foreign aid allocation, found the support for recipient 
needs at the eligibility stage and for donor interests and human rights at the eligibility and level 
stages. The findings of this study suggest that, while the impact of recipient needs, as measured 
by GDP per capita, on the aid allocation decisions made by U.S. government is positive and 
statistically significant, U.S. national security interests play a more prominent role in aid 
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allocation. Noticeably, countries perceived to be of vital importance to U.S. national security 
along with Latin America receive aid regardless of other factors. 
The studies often use the following variables to control for donor interests among others: 
political similarity, arm transfers, military presence, religious similarity, geographic proximity, 
proportion of a donor export or imports traded with a recipient country, stock of private direct 
investment from a donor to a recipient country. While per capita income is often included in 
empirical analysis to control for recipient needs, other variables such as infant mortality, 
literacy rate, and life expectancy are also widely used in aid allocation regressions for that 
purpose. 
The earlier study by Dudley and Montmarquette (1976) also found similar differences among 
donors. Despite the above-mentioned important differences among them, individual donors’ 
aid allocation decisions are influenced by the total amount of aid received from the rest of the 
donors. This is called a “bandwagon effect” whereby donor might expect that the impact of its 
aid on recipient country would be higher, the greater the aid the rest of the donors’ grants to a 
recipient country (Dudley and Montmarquette 1976). Literature also suggests that there is some 
alliance among large donors. For example, Katada (1997) finds that Japanese aid allocation 
decisions pursue the following simultaneous objectives: own political and economic interests, 
collaboration with the USA in support of USA maintenance in the developing world, and 
improvement of the USA-Japan relationship by satisfying US interests in Asia-Pacific region. 
 
Moreover, some studies investigate incentives in donor-recipient relations, and how they might 
influence the implementation of policy reforms intended to reduce poverty and promote 
development (Svensson, 2010). Svensson (2010) uses a game theoretic model in which an 
altruistic donor allocates aid according to recipient needs, and the aid allocation rule adversely 
affects recipients’ incentives to carry out policies to promote human development indicators: 
infant mortality, life expectancy, and primary school enrolment. 
 
Furthermore, researchers have also recently started to focus on the impact of the recipients’ 
governance on donors’ aid allocation decisions. The reviewed studies use various indicators to 
measure the quality of governance in recipient countries, including personal integrity rights 
(Apodaca and Stohl 2009), political and civil rights (Alesina and Dollar 2010, Trumbull and 
Wall 1994, Svensson 2010, Neumayer 2012), rule of law and corruption (Alesina and Dollar 
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2010, Neumayer 2012). For instance, Alesina and David (2010) explore the impact of the level 
of corruption of the recipient country on aid flows and find no evidence that corruption 
negatively affects the amount of foreign aid flows, but the Scandinavian countries appear to 
reward less corrupt countries with higher amounts of aid and large donors such as U.S., U.K., 
Japan and others appear indifferent to the level of corruption in a receiving country. According 
to Neumayer (2012) all aspects of good governance (he controls for democracy, human rights, 
corruption, rule of law, and regulatory burden) except for the rule of law have statistically 
significant influence on donors’ decisions in eligibility stage. He also finds that democracy, 
respect for human rights and low regulatory burden are statistically significant determinants of 
aid flows for some donors. Alesina and Dollar (2010) also find that, at the margin, developing 
countries that support political rights and civil liberties receive more aid, ceteris paribus. 
 
Knack (2010) examines the interdependence between foreign aid and the quality of governance 
by relating the quality of governance, as measured by indexes of bureaucratic quality, the rule 
of law, corruption and their simple combination (the paper calls it the quality of governance 
index, which is created by a simple summation of the first three indicators) to aid variable, as 
measured by the total foreign aid as percentage of GDP and percentage of government 
expenditures. The paper finds that higher levels of foreign aid erode the quality of governance. 
In addition to explaining the impact of donor interests, recipient needs and recipients’ 
governance on donors’ aid allocation policies, previous studies have revealed some population 
bias in the allocation of foreign aid. For example, Dudley and Montmarquette (1976) found a 
strongly significant correlation between per capita aid and the population of recipient countries. 
Trumbull and Wall (1994) also found some evidence of population bias. 
2.4  Other determinants of development aid flows 
A lot of literature has been written on the factors determining the flow of foreign aid. Political 
factors as well as the progress of development thinking have been considered to make a 
significant impact on the evolution of modern era foreign aid policy (Kanbur, 2006). According 
to Akramov (2006), this new era of development thinking is more complicated and non-linear 
in nature; the central geopolitical factors behind foreign aid were the Cold War until 1990s, the 
collapse of Soviet Union, and the events of September 11, 2001.  
 
The traditional motive for ODA is to foster economic growth in developing nations and this has 
been the driving economic objective of aid for decades. Chenery and Strout (1966) established 
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this in their “two-gap” model whereby they identify investment as the cornerstone of growth 
which requires, at least initially, imported capital goods. In this approach, aid is given to low-
income countries thus aid is much higher for countries with small populations. Besides 
economic growth, a large body of literature has also addressed the issue of donor interests as a 
determinant to foreign aid allocation, Maizels and Nissanke (1984), Frey and Schneider (1986) 
and Trumbull and Wall (1994). These authors have found evidence that donors’ strategic 
interests play a significant role in the allocation of foreign aid.  Frey and Schneider (1986) 
identified that the World Bank’s commitment to assistance is largely associated with good 
policies conditionality such as lowering the rate of inflation.    
 
Attempts by donors during the 1980s and 1990s to force recipient countries to conform to their 
imposed conditions attached to loans and grants are considered to have failed (Collier and 
Dollar, 2002). According to Jensen (2013), failure by donors, to apply conditionality in 
inducing economic, political and institutional reforms in recipient countries resulted in the 
introduction of ex-post selectivity whereby more foreign development aid is allocated to 
countries with a proven track record of ownership and commitment towards comprehensive 
reform and good governance. 
 
According to Dollar and Levine (2006), there is a broad agreement among economists and 
development specialists that countries’ institutions and economic policies are essential 
determinants of long-term growth and poverty reduction. Hall and Jones (1999) define 
institutions as norms, rules and behaviour or what they refer to as “social infrastructure”. Dollar 
and Levine (2006) further state that a government that provides a sound framework for growth 
and poverty reduction is also one that is more likely to use financial resources well to 
complement policies with necessary public investments in roads, schools, and the like. They 
determined that donor agencies tend to use institutional selectivity in allocating foreign aid, that 
is, channelling more aid resources to countries that have the institutional and policy framework 
to use the resources effectively (Dollar and Levine, 2006). 
 
Akramov (2012) analyses the impact of governance systems to the effectiveness of official 
development assistance (ODA). He categorises development aid into three categories namely:  
(1) economic;  
(2) social; and  
(3) other including emergency and food aid.  
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He concludes that the degree of a recipient country’s democratic governance has a significant 
impact to donors’ aid allocation decisions. The study concluded that countries with better 
democratic governance are more likely to receive higher amounts of aggregate per capita 
foreign aid and disaggregated, donors seem to provide relatively more social aid to “partially 
free” and “free” countries. However, the study also determined that there seems to be no 
difference among these three groups of countries in the per capita aid allocated for economic 
use (Akramov, 2012).  
 
The study by Akramov (2012) also found out that democratic governance does not guarantee 
the effectiveness of foreign development aid in promoting economic growth in recipient 
countries. In support of the findings by Dollar and Levine (2006) highlighted above, Akramov 
(2012) also concurs that economic development and growth can be promoted through ODA 
even under nondemocratic but pro-market regimes as long as they secure property rights and 
invest the ODA received in physical capital accumulation and economic infrastructure.  
 
Jensen (2013) and Ahlquist (2016) concur that more democratic countries attract more FDI than 
authoritarian countries because democracies tend to reduce the political risks of nationalization 
and expropriation and increase the credibility of the host country for foreign investors. On the 
other hand, Li and Resnick (2003) argues that democracy in the host country has a negative 
impact on FDI inflows due to the impact of the provision of labour at a lower cost, the repression 
of the unions, the entry treatment and the access to work in authoritarian regimes. Moreover, 
Daude and Stein (2017) are also assessed what to measure the quality of impact on investment 
decisions of institutions of foreign government investors, and they believe that unpredictable 
policies, excessive regulatory burden and lack of commitment of the Government to prevent 
the flow of FDI. Gani (2017) shows that improving the control of corruption, political stability, 
regulatory quality and the efficiency of government has a positive effect on the entry of FDI in 
some Latin American countries. Similarly, Buchanan et al. (2012) argue that, although the 
institutional quality index positively affects FDI flows, it negatively affects the volatility of FDI 
flows. More recently, Asiedu (2013) found evidence that the risk variable that FDI is the 
viability of contracts, repatriation of benefits and indicators of delinquency, has no significant 
effect on FDI flows. 
 
Some scholars, such as Alesina and Dollar (2010) and Neumayer (2003), argue that donor 
governments prioritize geostrategic or economic considerations over human rights that it is 
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unlikely that aid workers will systematically punish beneficiary governments for violations 
human rights. On the other hand, there are scholars who argue that some governments of donor 
countries sanction human rights violations by reducing foreign aid, although the cuts are limited 
to specific types and sectors of assistance (Lebovic and Voeten, 2009: Nielsen, 2013). 
 
A study conducted by Kurul and Yalta (2017) showed that not all governance indicators have 
a significant impact on the decisions of foreign investors in developing countries. They noted 
that corruption control, government effectiveness and voice and accountability had a significant 
positive impact on the flow of development assistance from abroad. To them, this discovery 
has shown that reducing corruption and excessive bureaucracy, improving the political system, 
transparency and accountability could lead to an increase in the flow of Foreign Development 
Aid. Furthermore, the implementation of policies to increase citizen participation in the political 
system, for example, by selecting their own government, as well as the protection of civil rights, 
can also increase Foreign Development Aid inflows. These findings may lead to the conclusion 
that countries that reflect the weakness of corruption control, effective governance, 
transparency in public policies, responsible bureaucracy, trust and participation in the political 
system must begin to reform their institutional policies and mechanisms to attract more Foreign 
Development Aid inflows. Therefore, improving the governance factors for a favourable 
investment environment should be an important policy guideline for developing countries. 
and2.5 Other sources of Governance Indicators 
There remains an ambiguity in the definition of the term governance and it is particularly 
challenging to measure the quality of governance. In recent years, different indicators have been 
developed to measure the quality of governance.  Kaufmann et. al (1999), combine the measures 
of governance into six indicators corresponding to the three dimensions of governance namely: 
i. Voice and Accountability measuring whether citizens participate in the selection and 
monitoring of their governments 
ii. Political stability which measures whether the government is vulnerable to change 
through violence 
iii. Government effectiveness which examines the capacity of civil servants, the quality of 
public servants, public service provision and the credibility of government commitment 
to policies 
iv. Regulatory quality which indicates whether the policies promoted are “market friendly” 
in the areas of trade and business 
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v. The rule of law which focuses on the enforcement of property rights and predictability 
of rules governing social and economic interactions and 
vi. Control of corruption which is determining whether there is the “exercise of public 
power for private gain”  
Kaufmann et. al (1999) 
 
The six indicators are composite considering that they were constructed using the unobserved 
components method, from more than 200 measures of governance from 37 different databases 
and have been widely used by academia and the development community. However, Arndt and 
Oman (2006) determine that the methodology used and the changing nature of these indicators 
over time makes them unreliable in comparing levels of governance over time, be it in a single 
country of between countries. These indicators also tend to measure the outcomes as opposed 
to permanent characteristics of governance institutions that tend to improve with per capita 
income (Glaeser et al, 2004).  
 
Akramov (2012) further identifies another source of governance indicators which is the 
Freedom House, whose annual ratings of political rights and civil liberties have been used to 
measure the strength of democratic governance in more than 190 countries throughout the 
world. The political rights index captures the extent to which citizens can participate in the 
political process by competing for public office and exercising a right to vote while the civil 
liberties index measures whether the citizens have freedom to develop opinions and personal 
autonomy without the interference of the state (Akramov, 2012).  
 
Another commonly used governance indicator is ICRG rating system produced by the Risk 
Services (PRS) Group. This is based on a set of 22 components grouped into three major 
categories namely political risk, financial risk and economic risk (PRS Group, 2011). The 
financial and economic risk assessments are based on objective data such as the country’s 
foreign debt, debt service ratio, international liquidity, current account and budget deficits, 
inflation, growth rates and so on. Political risk assessments however rely on subjective expert 
assessments of the prespecified risk components (Akramov, 2012). 
 
According to Dixit (2009), these widely used governance indicators relate to governance 
institutions which craft order and reshape incentives, thus building the governance structure of 
a country and leading to the formation of a national government. It is also evident that these 
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governance indicators capture two sides of governance: democratic or political governance and 
economic governance. Political governance refers to political institutions such as political 
rights, political stability and civil liberties whilst economic governance refers to the social and 
legal institutions that support economic activity by protecting property rights, enforcing 
contracts and promoting collective action to provide physical and organisational infrastructure 
(Dixit, 2009). 
 
Various arguments have been created that link democratic to economic governance and 
democracies tend to make the quality of economic governance better in the long run by allowing 
people to regularly and peacefully get rid of inefficient and incompetent governments while 
keeping efficient and competent governments. Nondemocratic regimes, on the other hand, can 
sometimes provide efficient and competent governments such as China, Singapore, South 
Korea and Malaysia in the 1980’s. However, if nondemocratic regimes do not provide 
competent and efficient governments, people find it easy to peacefully get rid of them thus it is 
broadly agreed, from the evidence gathered, that stronger democratic institutions are closely 
associated with better quality governance (Rivera-Batiz, 2002). 
 
From this existing literature, there is some wide agreement that the quality of governance 
significantly affects economic outcomes but however, there are some serious disputes regarding 
the mechanisms by which governance affects economic outcomes. For example, various 
researchers have concluded that the governance indicators are positively correlated to the 
measure of per capita income across countries. However, the findings regarding the direction 
of causality between quality of governance and the level of per capita income in a country have 
not been conclusive. According to Arndt and Oman (2006), the results are very sensitive to 
changes in the specifications of the econometric model and the variables included. They 
conclude in this study that the relationship between the quality of governance and per capita 
income is complicated (Arndt and Oman, 2006). Kaufmann and Kraay (2002), concluded that 
although better governance tends to promote growth in per capita income, the growth in per 
capita income per se does not tend to promote better governance.  
2.6 Effectiveness of Foreign Development Aid 
It has been long argued that foreign aid helps economic development through helping to 
complete and foster missing or incomplete markets in developing economies. Official 
development assistance (ODA) has been a major source of development finance in most 
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developing countries over the last couple of decades. A lot of literature has been generated on 
the effectiveness of aid though it remains inconclusive. There is however overwhelming 
evidence that foreign development aid has a positive impact in developing countries, but only 
under certain conditions. This has led to selectivity criteria being applied by donors in coming 
up with their allocation policies. Most authors seem to concur that sound governance structures 
and economic policies are essential to the effectiveness of foreign development aid and these 
play a significant role in foreign aid allocation. The point of disagreement in foreign aid 
literature is the extent to which the governance systems for developing countries are considered 
by donors in coming up with their foreign aid allocation policies. 
2.7 Conclusion 
As noted in the literature reviewed of previous studies on ODA, there are multiple factors that 
influence the allocation of foreign aid as well as its effectiveness. It was also noted that donors’ 
aid allocation could be guided by evaluation of the results of previous policies. However, past 
researches on the topic rarely linked governance of African countries to the allocation of foreign 
aid. Therefore, this study addresses this weakness by linking recipients’' quality of governance, 
using the IIAG indicator scores, to the allocation of foreign aid. The figure 2.1 below illustrates 
the conceptual framework for the understanding of the relationship between governance 
indicators and the allocation of foreign aid in Sub-Saharan African countries. The arrows in the 
figure below represent the links among the respective variables as well as the potential direction 
of the causal linkage. The conceptual framework illustrates that IIAG governance indicators 
might influence the allocation of foreign aid in Sub-Saharan African countries.  
As illustrated in figure 2.1 below the first transmission channel is through Safety and Rule of 
Law indicators’ potential impact on the allocation of foreign aid to a Sub-Saharan African 
country. The level of a country's governance performance, in terms of Safety and Rule of Law 
as well as according to IIAG scores, is hypothesized by the researcher to have an impact donors' 
allocation of foreign aid in Sub-Saharan Africa; the second channel is posited to be the 
interrelationship between Participation and Human Rights indicators and the allocation of 
foreign aid to a Sub-Saharan African country. The level of a country's governance performance, 
in terms of Participation and Human Rights as well as according to IIAG scores, is 
hypothesized by the researcher to have an impact donors' allocation of foreign aid in Sub-
Saharan Africa. Furthermore, the third transmission channel is through the potential impact of 
Sustainable Economic Opportunity indicators on the allocation of foreign aid to a Sub-
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Saharan African country. The level of a country's governance performance, in terms of 
Sustainable Economic Opportunity as well as according to IIAG scores, is hypothesized by 
the researcher to have an impact donors' allocation of foreign aid in Sub-Saharan Africa; and 
the fourth channel is posited to be the interrelationship between Human Development 
indicators and the allocation of foreign aid to a Sub-Saharan African country. The level of a 
country's governance performance, in terms of Human Development as well as according to 
IIAG scores, is hypothesized by the researcher to have an impact donors' allocation of foreign 
aid in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Figure 2.1 Conceptual Framework 
 














Source: Researcher (2017)  
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3.1 Introduction  
This chapter shall provide the research methodology used for this study. It covered such as the 
research approach and strategy adopted in this study, choice of data and sampling, data analysis 
methods chosen as well as research reliability and validity. 
 
3.2 Research Approach and Strategy 
In this study, a descriptive, cross-sectional sample survey was applied to answer the research 
objectives and test the hypotheses. One advantage of this design is that it enabled the researcher 
to target a specific area that is good governance as key to the flow of foreign development aid 
in Sub Saharan Africa. According to Saunders et al (2009) the survey is a popular and common 
strategy in business and management research and is usually associated with the deductive 
approach. Resultantly, this allowed for collection of large amounts of data from a relatively 
large population in a relatively economic way. For instance, the use of secondary data in this 
instance, allowed easy comparison through standardization of data. This study used a 
quantitative and structured descriptive survey method as the tool for primary data collection. 
The survey method was deemed most applicable for the purpose considering the public nature 
of the participants and the size of the population and the sample involved. A survey was carried 
out through the accessing records of the selected countries in Sub Sahara Africa regarding 
development aid flow.  
3.3 Choice of Data and Sampling 
The secondary data that was discussed and analysed were the results of the indicator scores for 
the years 2010 to 2015 showed in IIAG annual reports for each of the Sub-Saharan countries 
named below. Panel data was collected from the World Bank reports as well as from the IIAG 
annual reports that showed the trends in foreign aid reception as well as the quality of the 
governance rating of the IIAG. 
A sample is a smaller more manageable set of elements or a subset of a population selected to 
represent the population as a whole from which it is drawn (Langdridge & etal, 2013), Frey et 
al. (2000) define a sample as a “subgroup of a population” and (Kaplan & Duchon, 1988) 
describe it as a representative “taste” of a group. The process of selecting a portion of the 
population to represent the entire population is known as sampling (Polit & Hungler, 1999). 
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The purpose of a sample is to select a few members of the population to reach a conclusion 
about the population. This study used purposive sampling whereby he chose the countries 
mainly because they exhibited the variables and characteristics understudy. In Sub Saharan 
Africa the researcher chose the following 12 countries to participate in this survey. Angola, 
Botswana, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, 
Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The rationale for choosing these 12 countries was because 
they were all from the Southern African Region and they share almost homogenous 
characteristics, in terms of; weather, culture, religion, political stability and resources. Thus, 
the researcher believes that under such a scenario it would be prudent to use these 12 countries. 
3.4 Data Analysis Methods 
The study collected its data from secondary sources especially the web and the IIAG document. 
Findings from the secondary data which addressed the governance indicators in Sub-Saharan 
Africa for 2010 to 2015 according to IIAG as well as their Foreign Development Aid flow 
during the same period according to OECD and World Bank statistics were also discussed and 
presented in the form of tables. Furthermore, inferential analysis was undertaken using 
correlation test as well as regression to establish the relationships and/or impact of the 
governance indicators on the flow of Foreign Development Aid in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
The correlation analysis was undertaken to quantify the strength and type of 
relationship/association between the independent variables (Safety and Rule of Law; 
Participation and Human Rights; Sustainable Economic Opportunities and Human 
Development) and the dependent variable (Foreign Development Aid). The multiple regression 
analysis was also done to establish the effect and impact of independent variables (Safety and 
Rule of Law; Participation and Human Rights; Sustainable Economic Opportunities and 
Human Development) on the dependent variable (Flow of Foreign Development Aid).  
The following regression model was used for this study: 
, = + 1 , + 2 , + 3 , + 4 , + + ,  
Where:  and  denotes countries and years respectively; 
Y = Dependent variable (Flow of Foreign Development Aid) 
X = Independent governance variables (Governance) 
1 = Safety and Rule of Law (SRL) 
2= Participation and Human Rights (PHR) 
3= Sustainable Economic Opportunities (SEO) 
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4= Human Development (HD) 
µ = Unobserved firm specific effect 
ε = Error term 
3.4.1 Dependent variable 
Flow of Foreign Development Aid was the dependent variable for this study. Foreign 
development aid flow for the years 2010 to 2015 was extrapolated from OECD statistics for 
each of the following Sub-Saharan African countries, namely; Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe (OECD, 2016).   
3.4.2 Independent variables 
The independent variable for this study was the level of governance and it was measured by 
capturing the indicator scores for the four IIAG governance indicators for the years 2010 to 
2015 from the following Sub-Saharan African countries, namely; Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe (IIAG, 2016). The four IIAG indicators were Safety and Rule of Law; Participation 
and Human Rights; Sustainable Economic Opportunities and Human Development. 
Moreover, in terms of calculations, the indicators are designated that are consistent with the 
definition of fund management and meet certain quality, periodicity and coverage standards of 
the country, and the missing values of initial data are estimated. Source data is supplied in 
different scales from the source. For comparison and combination, data is converted to a 
standardized range of 0-100, where 100 is the best score possible. When 95 indicators have 
been converted to a common scale, a simple aggregation method is used to compute scores. 
The total score is the average score of the base category; the category calculates the average of 
the subcategories and subcategories - the average of their constituent indicators. 
All digits of the IIAG outputs are mapped to a decimal point. The calculation method for 
obtaining these estimates is as follows: 
 Estimates per country are based on full-precision data values  (using exact values as 
they are collected from the source). All points are rounded to a decimal. 
 Average values for the group are calculated based on rounded estimates, with a decimal. 
 Both trends in time and rank are calculated based on estimates with a decimal accuracy. 
Four hundred indicators have been formed by combining several basic sub-indicators, each of 
which measures the same size or similar concept. For each indicator, the sub-indicators may 
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come from one or more sources. The value of the cluster indicator is the average of the 
underlying indicators. 
3.5 Estimation Techniques 
Numerous techniques are available to estimate panel data studies and according to Park (2011) 
these models exist to evaluate group-specific or individual effects. However, in this study three 
regression model techniques were used to empirically examine the effects of the selected 
independent variables of governance on the dependent variable, of foreign development aid 
inflows into Sub-Saharan Africa. These models were Ordinary Least Squares Model, Random 
Effects Model and Fixed Effects Model. These shall be discussed in detail below in this section. 
3.5.1 Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Model 
This is the simplest regression model form and it is a multiple regression model that is applied 
to panel data. It is expressed as follows: 
Y  = 0 + 1X1 + ... + 2X2 +  
Whereby: 
- Y  is the dependent variable where i= entity and t= time 
- X  represents the independent variable/s 
-  is the coefficient for the independent variable/s 
-  is the overall error term 
-  is variable 1, 2, 3, 4  
The advantage of using a pooled OLS Regression estimator is that it approximates the 
population sample with greater accuracy, as compared to the other two models (i.e. the Fixed 
and Random Effect models), which are prone to omitted variable bias. On the other hand, the 
main disadvantage it has is that it disregards the time and individual dimensions of panel data 
as well as assuming that the relationship must hold for all observations for that variable across 
time. Hence this model could be considered as consistent (as they closely approximate the 
population) but not efficient. 
3.5.2 Fixed Effect Model 
This model explores the relationship between predictor and outcome variables within an entity 
(country, person, company, etc.). Furthermore, each entity has its own individual characteristics 
that may or may not influence the predictor variables. When using this model, it should be 
assumed that something within the individual may impact or bias the predictor or outcome 
variables and there is need to control for this. This is the rationale behind the assumption of the 
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correlation between entity’s error term and predictor variables. Moreover, fixed effect model 
removes the effect of those time-invariant characteristics so one can assess the net effect of the 
predictors on the outcome variable. 
Another important assumption of the fixed effect model is that those time-invariant 
characteristics are unique to the individual and should not be correlated with other individual 
characteristics. Each entity is different therefore the entity’s error term and the constant (which 
captures individual characteristics) should not be correlated with the others. If the error terms 
are correlated, then fixed effect model is no suitable since inferences may not be correct and 
one may need to model that relationship (probably using random-effects), this is the main 
rationale for the Hausman test. 
The equation for the fixed effects model becomes: 
a) Equation 1 
Yit = β1Xit + αi +  [eq.1] 
Where 
- αi (i=1….n) is the unknown intercept for each entity (n entity-specific intercepts). 
- Yit is the dependent variable where i = entity and t = time. 
- Xit represents one independent variable, 
- β1 is the coefficient for that independent variable, 
-  is the error term 
b) Equation 2 
Another way to see the fixed effects model is by using binary variables. The equation for the 
fixed effects model therefore becomes: 
Yit = β0 + β1X1,it +…+ βkXk,it + γ2E2 +…+ γnEn +  [eq.2] 
Where 
- Yit is the dependent variable where i = entity and t = time. 
- Xk,it represents independent variables, 
- βk is the coefficient for the independent variables, 
-  is the error term 
- En is the entity n. Since they are binary (dummies) you have n-1 entities included in the 
model. 
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c) Equation 3 
Time effects could be added to the entity effects model to have a time and entity fixed effects 
regression model: 
Yit = β0 + β1X1, it +…+ βkXk,it + γ2E2 +…+ γnEn + δ2T2 +…+ δtTt +  [eq.3] 
Where 
- Yit is the dependent variable where i = entity and t = time. 
- Xk,it represents independent variables, 
- βk is the coefficient for the independent variables, 
-  is the error term 
- En is the entity n. Since they are binary (dummies) you have n-1 entities included in the 
model. 
- γ2 is the coefficient for the binary repressors (entities) 
- Tt is time as binary variable (dummy), so we have t-1 time periods. 
- δt is the coefficient for the binary time regressors. 
Control for time effects whenever unexpected variation or special events my affect the outcome 
variable. 
3.5.3 Random Effect Model 
The rationale behind random effects model is that, unlike the fixed effects model, the variation 
across entities is assumed to be random and uncorrelated with the predictor or independent 
variables included in the model. According to Green (2008, p.183) “…the crucial distinction 
between fixed and random effects is whether the unobserved individual effect embodies 
elements that are correlated with the regressors in the model, not whether these effects are 
stochastic or not.” If there is a reason to believe that differences across entities have some 
influence on the dependent variable then one should use random effects. An advantage of 
random effects is that it can include time invariant variables (i.e. gender). However, in the fixed 
effects model these variables are absorbed by the intercept. The random effects model is: 
Yi = β1Xi + β2Xi + β3Xi + β4Xi + α + i + εi 
Where 
- Yi is the dependent variable where i = entity 
- Xi represents one of the independent variables, 
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3.6 Limitations 
Data gathering, and processing is very expensive. The researcher faced this constraint and 
therefore could not afford to conduct extensive surveys physically in each country to gather 
primary data, whatever the potential benefits, and lacked the funds to pay specialist research 
agencies to gather such data for him. This forced the researcher to rely on data that is less than 
‘perfect’ but that could be accessed more cheaply, like that from secondary sources.  There 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a discussion of the results and findings from the secondary data which 
addressed the governance indicators in Sub-Saharan Africa for 2010 to 2015 according to IIAG 
as well as their Foreign Development Aid flow during the same period according to OECD and 
World Bank statistics. Furthermore, inferential analysis will be undertaken using correlation 
test as well as regression to establish the relationships and/or impact of the governance 
indicators on the flow of Foreign Development Aid in Sub-Saharan Africa. The chapter shall 
be divided in to three sections were by Section A shall analyse and discuss the indicators of 
Governance, Section B shall analyse and discuss whilst Section C shall provide an analysis and 
discussion of the inferential analysis results and findings. At the end of the chapter a conclusion 
of the chapter shall be provided. 
Indicators of Governance 
This section shall focus on all the indicators of governance as determined by the IIAG, namely; 
safety and rule of law, participation and human rights, sustainable economic opportunity and 
human development (IIAG, 2016) in the following Sub-Saharan countries, namely; Angola, 
Botswana, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, 
Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The secondary data to be discussed and analysed were the 
results of the indicator scores for the years 2010 to 2015 showed in IIAG annual reports for 
each of the Sub-Saharan countries named above.  
4.2 Safety and Rule of Law 
This section discusses the results of the indicator scores on the Safety and Rule of Law indicator 
for the years 2010 to 2015 for each of the Sub-Saharan countries, namely; Angola, Botswana, 
Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, 
Zambia and Zimbabwe. The scores are shown in Table 4.1 and 4.2.  
Table 4.1 Safety and Rule of Law Indicator Scores for Sub-Saharan Africa Countries (2010-
2015) 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Trend 2010-2015 
Angola 43.7 44.8 45.4 45.1 44.5 44.3 0.6 
Botswana 84.6 85.1 84.2 83.9 82.1 81.9 -2.7 
Lesotho 64.9 66.1 66.9 66.3 67.1 67.1 2.2 
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Madagascar 46.9 45 46.5 49.6 51.5 55 8.1 
Malawi 65.6 63.2 64.6 64.4 62.5 62.2 -3.4 
Mauritius 83.8 84 84.4 82.2 82.3 80.8 -3 
Mozambique 60.7 62 60 54.9 54.2 54 -6.7 
Namibia 75.2 76.1 74.8 74.5 74.8 76.1 0.9 
South Africa 69.2 69.7 65.7 66.6 66.9 67.1 -2.1 
Swaziland 58.7 60 58.6 60.6 60.2 60.8 2.1 
Zambia 65 67 68.4 67.1 66.3 66.5 1.5 
Zimbabwe 36.1 36.4 38.8 42.4 43.5 43.8 7.7 
Source: IIAG (2016) 
Table 4.1 above shows the Safety and Rule of Law indicator scores for the years 2010 to 2015 
according to the IIAG annual reports for each of the Sub-Saharan countries. According to the 
table above shows that the Safety and Rule of Law indicators for Botswana, Malawi, Mauritius, 
South Africa as well as Mozambique have decreased throughout the years from 2010 to 2015 
with Mozambique (-6.7) deteriorating the most followed by Malawi (-3.4). On the other hand, 
the Safety and Rule of Law indicators for Angola, Namibia, Swaziland, Zambia, Lesotho, 
Madagascar and Zimbabwe have increased throughout the same period. Furthermore, in terms 
of Safety and Rule of Law indicators the biggest gainers during the period 2010 to 2015 were 
Madagascar (8.1) and Zimbabwe (7.7).  
4.2.1 Descriptive statistics for Safety and Rule of Law indicator in Sub-Sahara 
Furthermore, there is a descriptive statistics table which shows the means, minimum, maximum 
scores for the overall region as well as for each country. This is shown in table 4.2 below: 
Table 4.2 Descriptive Statistics for Safety and Rule of Law Indicator  
 Mean Min. Max. Std. Dev. Count 
Overall for Sub-Saharan region 63.1278 36.10 85.10 13.48765 6 
Botswana 83.6333 81.90 85.10 1.32916 6 
Mauritius 82.9167 80.80 84.40 1.38046 6 
Namibia 75.2500 74.50 76.10 0.69498 6 
South Africa 67.5333 65.70 69.70 1.56801 6 
Zambia 66.7167 65.00 68.40 1.11609 6 
Lesotho 66.4000 64.90 67.10 0.84617 6 
Malawi 63.7500 62.20 65.60 1.32929 6 
Swaziland 59.8167 58.60 60.80 0.94745 6 
Mozambique 57.6333 54.00 62.00 3.64783 6 
Madagascar 49.0833 45.00 55.00 3.72098 6 
Angola 44.6333 43.70 45.40 0.60553 6 
Zimbabwe 40.1667 36.10 43.80 3.51833 6 
Source: Researcher 
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The table 4.2 above shows that the average Safety and Rule of Law indicator for Sub-Saharan 
countries was 63.13 which is more than half with the country recording the highest indicator 
being Botswana with 85.10 whilst the lowest was Zimbabwe. Furthermore, the top 5 countries 
with the highest average Safety and Rule of Law ratings in Sub-Sahara were Botswana (83.63); 
Mauritius (82.92); Namibia (75.25); South Africa (67.53) and Zambia (66.71). on the other 
hand, there were three countries which had average scores on Safety and Rule of Law which 
were below half (50/100) and these were Madagascar (49.08); Angola (44.63) and lastly 
Zimbabwe (40.17). 
Therefore, these results show that according to IIAG (2016) in terms of Safety and Rule of Law 
the countries ranked the best in Sub-Saharan Africa were Botswana, Mauritius, Namibia, South 
Africa and Zambia whilst those ranked as the worst were Madagascar, Angola and Zimbabwe. 
However, the Safety and Rule of Law indicator scores for Madagascar and Zimbabwe seem to 
have improved the most whilst those for Botswana, Malawi, Mauritius and Mozambique have 
been on a downward trend during the 2010-2015 period.  
4.3 Participation and Human Rights 
This section discusses the results of the indicator scores on the Participation and Human Rights 
indicator for the years 2010 to 2015 for each of the Sub-Saharan countries, namely; Angola, 
Botswana, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, 
Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The scores are shown in Table 4.3 and 4.4. 
Table 4.3 Participation and Human Rights Indicator scores for Sub-Saharan Africa 
Countries (2010-2015) 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Trend 2010-2015 
Angola 37.8 36.4 37.1 37 35.5 35.5 -2.3 
Botswana 72.3 72.5 72.4 71.9 68.4 69.3 -3 
Lesotho 62.8 62.2 65.1 66.6 63.6 64.6 1.8 
Madagascar 54.3 52.9 51.8 54.2 58.8 64.7 10.4 
Malawi 62.3 62.7 64.4 65.5 64 65.8 3.5 
Mauritius 75.2 76.6 76.9 76.4 74 76 0.8 
Mozambique 57.6 55.9 57.2 57.9 58.6 58.3 0.7 
Namibia 69.8 70.9 71 70.9 75.1 76.1 6.3 
South Africa 71.4 71.6 71.1 70.8 72.2 71.4 0 
Swaziland 31.9 31.2 32.5 32.1 29.1 27.6 -4.3 
Zambia 60.9 62.2 61.4 59.7 59.5 61.4 0.5 
Zimbabwe 32.1 33.8 34.6 37.9 41.3 45.1 13 
Source: IIAG (2016) 
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According to the table 4.3 above shows the Participation and Human Rights indicator for the 
years 2010 to 2015 according to the IIAG annual reports for each of the Sub-Saharan countries. 
The table above shows that the Participation and Human Rights indicators for Angola, 
Botswana and Swaziland have been decreasing throughout the years from 2010 to 2015 with 
Swaziland (-4.3) deteriorating the most followed by Botswana (-3). On the other hand, the 
Participation and Human Rights indicators for Lesotho, Mauritius, Swaziland, Zambia, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia and Zimbabwe were on an increase throughout 
the same period. Additionally, in terms of Participation and Human Rights indicators the 
biggest gainers during the period 2010 to 2015 were Zimbabwe (13), Madagascar (10.4) and 
Namibia (6.3).  
4.3.1 Descriptive statistics for Participation and Human Rights indicator in Sub-Sahara 
In addition, a descriptive statistics table showing the means, minimum, maximum scores for 
the overall region as well as for each country were derived from the Participation and Human 
Rights scores for the period 2010 to 2015. The results are shown in table 4.4 below: 
Table 4.4 Descriptive Statistics for Participation and Human Rights Indicator 
 Mean Min. Max. Std. Dev. Count 
Overall for Sub-Saharan region 58.1889 27.60 76.90 14.95496 6 
Mauritius 75.85 74 76.9 1.08028 6 
Namibia 72.30 69.8 76.1 2.61304 6 
South Africa 71.42 70.8 72.2 0.47504 6 
Botswana 71.13 68.4 72.5 1.80296 6 
Lesotho 64.15 62.2 66.6 1.61462 6 
Malawi 64.12 62.30 65.8 1.42466 6 
Zambia 62.20 59.5 62.2 1.05594 6 
Madagascar 56.12 51.8 64.7 4.83380 6 
Mozambique 57.58 55.9 58.6 0.96212 6 
Zimbabwe 45.10 32.1 45.1 4.97219 6 
Angola 36.55 35.5 37.8 0.92682 6 
Swaziland 32.50 27.6 32.5 1.95209 6 
Source: Researcher 
Table 4.4 above shows that the average Participation and Human Rights indicator for Sub-
Saharan countries was 58.19 which is slightly more than half (50/100) and the country recording 
the highest indicator being Mauritius with 76.9 whilst the lowest was Swaziland with 27.6. 
Moreover, the top 5 countries with the highest average Participation and Human Rights ratings 
in Sub-Sahara were Mauritius (75.85); Namibia (72.30); South Africa (71.42); Botswana 
(71.13) and Lesotho (64.15). However, there were three countries which had average scores for 
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Participation and Human Rights which were below half (50/100) and these were Zimbabwe 
(45.10); Angola (36.55) and Swaziland (32.50). 
Consequently, these results show that in terms of Participation and Human Rights the countries 
ranked as the best in Sub-Sahara were Mauritius, Namibia, South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho 
and Malawi whilst those ranked as having the worst Participation and Human Rights were 
Zimbabwe, Angola and Swaziland. However, the Participation and Human Rights scores for 
Madagascar, Namibia and Zimbabwe improved throughout the period whilst those for Angola, 
Botswana and Swaziland declined during the period. 
4.4 Sustainable Economic Opportunity 
This section discusses the results of the indicator scores on the Sustainable Economic 
opportunity indicator for the years 2010 to 2015 for each of the Sub-Saharan countries, namely; 
Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South 
Africa, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The scores are shown in Table 4.5 and 4.6. 
Table 4.5 Sustainable Economic Opportunity indicator Scores for Sub-Saharan Africa 
Countries (2010-2015) 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Trend 2010-2015 
Angola 32.2 32 32.4 30.4 29.9 30.4 -1.8 
Botswana 67.2 67.6 67.6 66.6 66.2 65.2 -2 
Lesotho 45.6 45.7 46 47 47.2 45.6 0 
Madagascar 41.9 39.1 38 37.2 34.3 33.1 -8.8 
Malawi 49.8 48.2 46.6 46.9 44.9 44.1 -5.7 
Mauritius 79.1 79.6 80.2 80.6 79.8 79 -0.1 
Mozambique 47.8 47.9 47 46.3 46.1 47.3 -0.5 
Namibia 61.5 60.1 59 61.6 62.3 62.2 0.7 
South Africa 69.2 68.7 68.9 68.8 68.8 68.4 -0.8 
Swaziland 49.5 47.4 48.2 49.9 49.6 49.7 0.2 
Zambia 44.5 47 48 48.8 48.5 46.4 1.9 
Zimbabwe 23.4 23.9 25.1 27.2 29.9 34.6 11.2 
Source: IIAG (2016) 
From table 4.5 above, the Sustainable Economic opportunity indicators for Angola, Botswana, 
Madagascar, South Africa, Mauritius, Mozambique and Zambia dwindled throughout the years 
from 2010 to 2015 with the worst performers being Madagascar (-8.8), Malawi (-5.7) and 
Angola (-1.8). On the other hand, the Sustainable Economic opportunity indicators for Namibia, 
Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe rose during the same period with the most improved 
countries being Zimbabwe (11.2) and Zambia (1.9).  
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4.4.1 Descriptive statistics for Sustainable Economic opportunity indicator in Sub-Sahara 
Furthermore, a descriptive statistics table showing the means, minimum, maximum scores for 
the overall region as well as for each country were derived from the Sustainable Economic 
opportunity scores for the period 2010 to 2015. The results are shown in table 4.6 below: 
Table 4.6 Descriptive Statistics for Sustainable Economic Opportunity Indicator 
 Mean Min. Max. Std. Dev. Count 
Overall for Sub-Saharan region 50.7042 23.40 80.60 15.21549 6 
Mauritius 79.72 79 80.6 0.62102 6 
South Africa 68.8 68.4 69.2 0.26077 6 
Botswana 66.73 65.2 67.6 0.93524 6 
Namibia 61.12 59 62.3 1.30141 6 
Swaziland 49.05 47.4 49.9 1.00946 6 
Malawi 46.75 44.1 49.8 2.09261 6 
Zambia 47.2 44.5 48.8 1.60375 6 
Mozambique 47.07 46.1 47.9 0.75011 6 
Lesotho 46.18 45.6 47.6 0.72778 6 
Madagascar 37.27 33.1 41.9 3.21040 6 
Angola 31.22 29.9 32.4 1.09985 6 
Zimbabwe 27.35 23.4 34.6 4.28147 6 
Source: Researcher 
Table 4.6 above shows that the average Sustainable Economic opportunity indicator for Sub-
Saharan countries was 50.70 which is marginally above half (50/100) and the country that 
recorded the highest score was Mauritius with 80.60, which was in 2013, whilst the lowest was 
Zimbabwe with 27.6, which was in 2010. Moreover, there were only four countries in Sub-
Sahara that had an average Sustainable Economic opportunity rating above half (50/100) 
namely Mauritius (79.72); South Africa (68.8); Botswana (66.73) and Namibia (61.12). On the 
other hand, the rest of the other countries had average scores for Sustainable Economic 
opportunity which were below half (50/100) with the worst three being Madagascar (37.22); 
Angola (31.22) and lastly Zimbabwe (27.35). 
Subsequently, these results show that in terms of Sustainable Economic opportunity the 
countries ranked as the best in Sub-Sahara were Mauritius, South Africa, Botswana and 
Namibia whilst the rest of the other countries had average scores for Sustainable Economic 
opportunity which were below half (50/100) with the worst three being Madagascar, Angola 
and Zimbabwe. Conversely, the Sustainable Economic opportunity scores for Namibia, 
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Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe seem to have improved whilst those for Madagascar, 
Malawi and Angola deteriorated the most during the 2010-2015 period. 
4.5 Human Development 
This section discusses the results of the indicator scores on the Human Development indicator 
for the years 2010 to 2015 for each of the Sub-Saharan countries, namely; Angola, Botswana, 
Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, 
Zambia and Zimbabwe. The scores are shown in Table 4.7 and 4.8. 
Table 4.7 Human Development Indicator Scores for Sub-Saharan Africa Countries (2010-
2015) 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Trend 2010-2015 
Angola 43 45.1 46.3 45.6 46.7 46.7 3.7 
Botswana 76.7 77.8 79.1 79.4 78.5 78.5 1.8 
Lesotho 53.3 53.4 51.9 52.8 52.4 53.8 0.5 
Madagascar 49.6 47.1 45 44.2 42.5 49.1 -0.5 
Malawi 53.4 54.5 54.5 54.8 53.2 54.3 0.9 
Mauritius 83.1 84.2 84.2 84.1 83.8 83.7 0.6 
Mozambique 50.7 50.1 50 49.4 49.5 49.5 -1.2 
Namibia 61.4 61.8 62.8 65.1 66.5 64.7 3.3 
South Africa 69.9 70.9 71 71.2 70.1 70.6 0.7 
Swaziland 58.3 58.3 58.5 59.8 60.7 60.7 2.4 
Zambia 55.7 56 58.5 60.1 60.6 61 5.3 
Zimbabwe 49.7 53.5 54.9 53.9 53.4 53.8 4.1 
Source: IIAG (2016) 
The table 4.7 above shows the Human Development indicator for the years 2010 to 2015 
according to the IIAG annual reports for each of the Sub-Saharan countries. The table above 
shows that Madagascar (-0.5) and Mozambique’s (-1.2) Human Development indicators could 
be considered to have decreased throughout the 2010 to 2015 period. On the other hand, the 
Human Development indicators for Angola, Swaziland, Botswana, Lesotho, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, South Africa, Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe experienced 
an upturn throughout the same period. The countries that experienced the highest upturn during 
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4.5.1 Descriptive statistics for Human Development indicator in Sub-Sahara 
As an addition, a descriptive statistics table showing the means, minimum, maximum scores 
for the overall region as well as for each country were derived from the Human Development 
scores for the period 2010 to 2015. The results are shown in table 4.8 below: 
Table 4.8 Descriptive Statistics for Human Development Indicator 
 Mean Min. Max. Std. Dev. Count 
Overall for Sub-Saharan region 59.7069 42.50 84.20 11.93538 6 
Mauritius 83.85 83.1 84.2 0.42308 6 
Botswana 78.33 76.7 79.4 0.97297 6 
South Africa 70.62 69.9 71.2 0.51929 6 
Namibia 63.72 61.4 66.5 2.02526 6 
Swaziland 59.38 58.3 60.7 1.16347 6 
Zambia 58.65 55.7 61 2.33131 6 
Malawi 54.12 53.2 54.8 0.65549 6 
Zimbabwe 53.2 49.7 54.9 1.79555 6 
Lesotho 52.93 51.9 53.8 0.70333 6 
Mozambique 49.87 49.4 50.7 0.50067 6 
Madagascar 46.25 42.5 49.6 2.82471 6 
Angola 45.57 43 46.7 1.40807 6 
Source: Researcher 
Table 4.8 above shows that the average Human Development indicator for Sub-Saharan 
countries was 59.71 which is more than half (50/100) and the country recording the highest 
indicator was Mauritius with 84.2, which was in 2011 and 2012, whilst the lowest was 
Madagascar with 42.5, which was recorded in 2014. Moreover, the top 5 countries with the 
highest average Human Development ratings in Sub-Sahara were Mauritius (83.85); Botswana 
(78.33); South Africa (70.62); Namibia (63.72) and Swaziland (59.38). On the other hand, there 
were three countries which had average scores for Human Development which were below half 
(50/100) and these were Mozambique (49.87); Madagascar (46.25) and lastly Angola (45.57). 
As a result, these results show that Mauritius, Botswana, South Africa, Namibia and Swaziland 
in terms of Human Development are the countries ranked as the best in Sub-Sahara whilst those 
ranked as having the worst Human Development were Mozambique, Madagascar and Angola. 
Conversely, the Human Development scores for Angola, Zambia and Zimbabwe improved the 
most whilst those for Madagascar and Mozambique declined the most during the 2010-2015 
period. 
 
38 | P a g e  
 
4.6 Overall Governance 
This Overall Governance indicator for the years 2010 to 2015 for each of the Sub-Saharan 
countries, namely; Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, 
Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe are shown in table 4.9 and 4.10. 
Table 4.9 Overall Governance Indicator Scores for Sub-Saharan Africa Countries (2010-
2015) 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Trend 2010-2015 
Angola 39.2 39.6 40.3 39.5 39.2 39.2 0 
Botswana 75.2 75.8 75.8 75.5 73.8 73.7 -1.5 
Lesotho 56.6 56.9 57.5 58.2 57.6 57.8 1.2 
Madagascar 48.2 46 45.3 46.3 46.7 48.5 0.3 
Malawi 57.8 57.2 57.5 57.9 56.2 56.6 -1.2 
Mauritius 80.3 81.1 81.5 80.8 80 79.9 -0.4 
Mozambique 54.2 53.9 53.5 52.1 52.1 52.3 -1.9 
Namibia 67 67.2 66.9 68 69.7 69.8 2.8 
South Africa 69.9 70.2 69.2 69.4 69.5 69.4 -0.5 
Swaziland 49.6 49.2 49.5 50.6 49.9 49.1 -0.5 
Zambia 56.5 58 59.1 58.9 58.7 58.8 2.3 
Zimbabwe 35.3 36.9 38.4 40.4 42.1 44.3 9 
Source: IIAG (2016) 
The table 4.9 above shows the Overall Governance indicator for the years 2010 to 2015 
according to the IIAG annual reports for each of the Sub-Saharan countries. The table above 
shows that the Overall Governance scores for Botswana, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, 
South Africa and Swaziland dwindled throughout the 2010 to 2015 period with worst affected 
being Mozambique (-1.9), Botswana (-1.5) and Malawi (-1.2). However, the Overall 
Governance scores for Lesotho, Namibia, Madagascar, Zambia and Zimbabwe rose throughout 
the same period with the most improved countries being Zimbabwe (9), Namibia (2.8) and 
Zambia (2.3).  
4.6.1 Descriptive statistics for Overall Governance indicator in Sub-Sahara 
Furthermore, a descriptive statistics table showing the means, minimum, maximum scores for 
the overall region as well as for each country were derived from the Overall Governance scores 
for the period 2010 to 2015. The results are shown in table 4.10 below: 
Table 4.10 Descriptive Statistics for Overall Governance Indicator 
 Mean Min. Max. Std. Dev. Count 
Overall for Sub-Saharan region 57.9000 35.30 81.50 12.84850 6 
Mauritius 80.6 79.90 81.50 0.63875 6 
Botswana 74.7667 73.70 75.80 0.96885 6 
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South Africa 69.6 69.20 70.20 0.37417 6 
Namibia 68.1 66.90 69.80 1.33566 6 
Zambia 58.33 56.50 59.10 0.97297 6 
Lesotho 57.433 56.60 58.20 0.58878 6 
Malawi 57.200 56.20 57.90 0.67823 6 
Mozambique 53.0167 52.10 54.20 0.96003 6 
Swaziland 49.65 49.10 50.60 0.54681 6 
Madagascar 46.833 45.30 48.50 1.26438 6 
Zimbabwe 39.566 35.30 44.30 3.35241 6 
Angola 39.5 39.20 40.30 0.42895 6 
Source: IIAG (2016) 
Table 4.10 above shows that the average Overall Governance indicator for Sub-Saharan 
countries was 57.9 which is above half (50/100) and the country that recorded the highest score 
was Mauritius with 81.50, which was in 2012, whilst the lowest was Zimbabwe with 35.30, 
which was in 2010. Moreover, the top 5 countries with the highest average Overall Governance 
rating where namely Mauritius (80.6); Botswana (74.77); South Africa (69.6) and Namibia 
(68.1). On the other hand, there were four other countries that had average scores for Overall 
Governance which were below half (50/100) namely Swaziland (49.65); Madagascar (46.83); 
Zimbabwe (39.57) and lastly Angola (39.5). 
Consequently, these results show that in terms of Overall Governance the countries ranked as 
the best in Sub-Sahara were Mauritius, Botswana, South Africa and Namibia whilst the 
countries that had average scores for Overall Governance which were below half (50/100) were 
Swaziland, Madagascar, Zimbabwe and Angola. On the contrary, the Overall Governance 
scores for Botswana, Malawi and Mozambique declined the most during the period whilst for 
Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe they were the countries that improved the most throughout 
the same period. 
4.7 Flow of Foreign Development Aid in Sub-Saharan Africa 
This section shall focus on the flow of foreign development aid (OECD, 2016) in the following 
Sub-Saharan African countries, namely; Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The 
secondary data to be discussed and analysed were the foreign development aid flow for the 
years 2010 to 2015 showed in OECD statistics for each of the Sub-Saharan African countries 
named above. 
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4.7.1 Foreign Development Aid 
This discusses the flow of foreign development aid for the years 2010 to 2015 for each of the 
Sub-Saharan African countries, namely; Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The 
scores are shown in table 4.11 and 4.12 below. 
Table 4.11 Flow of Foreign Development Aid for Sub-Saharan Africa Countries (2010-2015) 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Trend 2010-2015 
Angola 218.23 186.62 222.67 255.14 768.54 835.6 617.37 
Botswana 144.12 645.18 121.41 12.65 122.35 -21.32 -165.44 
Lesotho 232.9 261.52 280.18 322.18 99.88 83.14 -149.76 
Madagascar 599.65 552.27 350.69 364.29 404.32 520.05 -79.6 
Malawi 946.01 711.5 1068.49 1030.1 841.06 1048.48 102.47 
Mauritius 423.09 221.57 134.05 320.08 133.89 71.96 -351.13 
Mozambique 1867.61 1861.23 1963.98 2240.6 1956.96 1895.25 27.64 
Namibia 361.28 254.05 215.23 219.95 264.54 162.02 -199.26 
South Africa 1875.3 2193.31 2700.41 1775.53 1787.53 1665.51 -209.79 
Swaziland 67.99 101.42 75.04 104.12 81.09 98.82 30.83 
Zambia 729.17 938.22 908.96 1026.59 919.99 861.66 132.49 
Zimbabwe 682.5 655.81 943.89 759.19 690.99 765 82.5 
Source: OECD statistics (2016) and World Bank (2016) 
The table 4.11 above shows the flow of foreign development aid for the years 2010 to 2015 to 
each of the Sub-Saharan countries. The table above shows that Botswana, Lesotho, 
Madagascar, Mauritius, Namibia and South Africa’s flow of foreign development aid could be 
considered to have decreased during the 2010 to 2015 period with the worst affected countries 
being Mauritius (-US$351.13m), South Africa (-US$209.79m) and Namibia (-US$199.26). On 
the other hand, the flow of foreign development aid in Angola, Malawi, Mauritius, 
Mozambique, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe experienced an upturn throughout the same 
period. Furthermore, the countries that recorded the highest upturn in foreign development aid 
flow were Angola (US$617.37m), Malawi (US$102.47m) and Zimbabwe (US$82.5m). 
 
4.7.2 Descriptive statistics for Flow of Foreign Development Aid in Sub-Saharan Africa 
Additionally, a descriptive statistics table showing the means, minimum, maximum scores for 
the overall region as well as for each country were derived from the flow of foreign 
development aid for the period 2010 to 2015. The results are shown in table 4.12 below: 
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Table 4.12 Descriptive Statistics for Flow of Foreign Development Aid 
 Mean Min. Max. Std. Dev. Count 
Overall for Sub-Saharan region 697.2678 -21.32 2700.41 156.98 6 
South Africa 1999.60 1665.51 2700.41 387.53 6 
Mozambique 1964.27 1861.23 2240.60 142.22 6 
Malawi 940.94 711.50 1068.49 140.31 6 
Zambia 897.43 729.17 1026.59 98.57 6 
Zimbabwe 749.56 655.81 943.89 104.70 6 
Angola 414.46 186.62 835.60 301.76 6 
Madagascar 465.21 350.69 599.65 105.52 6 
Botswana 170.73 -21.32 648.18 241.85 6 
Namibia 246.18 162.02 361.28 66.90 6 
Mauritius 217.44 71.60 423.09 132.62 6 
Lesotho 213.30 83.14 322.18 98.84 6 
Swaziland 88.08 67.99 104.12 15.32 6 
Source: Researcher 
Table 4.12 above shows that the average flow of foreign development aid for Sub-Saharan 
Africa was US$697 million and the country which received the highest foreign development 
aid was South Africa with US$2.7 billion, which they received in 2012, whilst the lowest was 
Botswana with –US$21.32 million, which was received in 2015. Furthermore, the countries 
with the highest average foreign development aid flow in Sub-Saharan Africa were South 
Africa (US$1.999 billion); Mozambique (US$1.964 billion); Malawi (US$940 million); 
Zambia (US$897 million); Zimbabwe (US$749 million); Angola (US$414 million) and 
Madagascar (US$465 million). On the other hand, those countries which received the lowest 
average foreign development aid were Botswana (US$170 million); Namibia (US$246 
million); Mauritius (US$217 million); Lesotho (US$213 million) and finally Swaziland (US$88 
million). 
Consequently, these results show that South Africa, Mozambique, Malawi, Zambia, Zimbabwe, 
Angola and Madagascar in terms of foreign development aid flow are the countries ranked as 
receiving the most foreign development aid in Sub-Saharan Africa whilst those ranked to have 
received the least foreign development aid flow were Botswana, Namibia, Mauritius, Lesotho 
and Swaziland. Furthermore, there was a decreasing trend in foreign development aid flow 
mainly for South Africa, Mauritius and Namibia whilst during the same period it increased for 
Angola, Malawi and Zimbabwe. 
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SECTION C: INFERENTIAL ANALYSES 
This section provides the inferential analyses which involved the use of Spearman's coefficient 
of correlation as well as regression analysis. The correlation analysis was undertaken to 
quantify the strength and type of relationship/association between the independent variables 
(Safety and Rule of Law; Participation and Human Rights; Sustainable Economic Opportunities 
and Human Development) and the dependent variable (Foreign Development Aid). The 
multiple regression analysis was also done to establish the effect and impact of independent 
variables (Safety and Rule of Law; Participation and Human Rights; Sustainable Economic 
Opportunities and Human Development) on the dependent variable (Flow of Foreign 
Development Aid). 
4.8 Correlation Analysis 
Below in table 4.13 are the results of the correlation analysis undertaken to quantify the strength 
and type of relationship/association between the dependent variable and the independent 
variables. The independent variables were namely: Safety and Rule of Law; Participation and 
Human Rights; Sustainable Economic Opportunities and Human Development: whilst the 
dependent variable which was the Flow of Foreign Development Aid in Sub-Saharan Africa. 






















1.000 -.258* -.027 -.159 -.237* -.115 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
. .029 .820 .181 .045 .338 
N 72 72 72 72 72 72 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Table 4.13 above shows that there is a correlation coefficient of -0.258 between Foreign 
Development Aid and Safety and Rule of Law. Furthermore, the sig-value for the two variables 
was 0.029 which is less than the significance level of 0.05. This entails that there is a statistically 
significant weak but negative relationship between Safety and Rule of Law and Foreign 
Development Aid Flow in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
43 | P a g e  
 
On the other hand, the table above also shows that there is a correlation coefficient of -0.027 
between Foreign Development Aid and Participation and Human Rights. In addition, the sig-
value for the two variables was 0.820 which is more than the significance level of 0.05. This 
means that there is a weak but negative relationship between Participation and Human Rights 
and Foreign Development Aid Flow in Sub-Saharan Africa however it is not statistically 
significant. 
Moreover, according to the table above there is a correlation coefficient of -0.159 between 
Foreign Development Aid and Sustainable Economic Opportunities. Additionally, the sig-value 
for the two variables was 0.181 which is more than the significance level of 0.05. This means 
that even though the correlation coefficient value entail that there is a weak but negative 
relationship between Sustainable Economic Opportunities and Foreign Development Aid Flow 
in Sub-Saharan Africa however the sig-value above 0.05 shows that the association and 
relationship between the two variables is not statistically significant. 
The table above also highlights that there is a correlation coefficient of -0.237 between Foreign 
Development Aid and Human Development. Furthermore, the sig-value for the two variables 
was 0.045 which is less than the significance level of 0.05. This entails that there is a statistically 
significant weak but negative relationship between Human Development and Foreign 
Development Aid Flow in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Furthermore, in terms of the correlation between Overall Governance and Flow of Foreign 
Development Aid the table above shows that there is a correlation coefficient of -0.115 and a 
sig-value of 0.338 which is greater than the significance level of 0.05. This means that even 
though the correlation coefficient value entail that there is a weak but negative relationship 
between Overall Governance and Foreign Development Aid Flow in Sub-Saharan Africa the 
sig-value above 0.05 however shows that the association and relationship between the two 
variables is not statistically significant. 
Therefore, the findings show that there is no statistically significant relationship or association 
between the Participation and Human Rights and Sustainable Economic Opportunity indicators 
and the Flow of Foreign Development Aid. This could mean that Participation and Human 
Rights indicators like political participation, human rights and gender issues as well as 
Sustainable Economic Opportunity indicators like the state of a country’s public management, 
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business environment, infrastructure and rural sector have no relationship or association with 
the flow of Foreign Development Aid in Sub-Saharan Africa.  
On the other hand, the findings from the correlation analysis also show that there is a 
statistically significant but negative relationship or association between Safety and Rule of Law 
and Human Development and the Flow of Foreign Development Aid. This might mean that 
Safety and Rule of Law indicators like rule of law, accountability, personal safety and national 
security as well as Human Development indicators like the state of a country’s welfare, 
education and health sector have a negative relationship or association with the flow of Foreign 
Development Aid in Sub-Saharan Africa.  
However, the findings show that there is no statistically significant relationship or association 
between Overall Governance and the Flow of Foreign Development Aid. This could mean that 
a country’s Overall Governance score has no relationship or association with the flow of 
Foreign Development Aid in Sub-Saharan Africa.  
Therefore, these findings are in line with Kurul and Yalta (2017) who postulate that not all 
governance indicators have a significant impact on the Flow of Foreign Development Aid in 
developing countries. They noted that corruption control, government effectiveness and voice 
and accountability had a significant positive impact on the flow of development assistance from 
abroad. Furthermore, this discovery has shown that reducing corruption and excessive 
bureaucracy, improving the political system, transparency and accountability could lead to an 
increase in the flow of Foreign Development Aid. Furthermore, the implementation of policies 
to increase citizen participation in the political system, for example, by selecting their own 
government, as well as the protection of civil rights, can also increase Foreign Development 
Aid inflows. 
4.9 Regression Analysis – Governance Indicators 
The section below shows that in table 4.14 there are the results of the regression analysis 
undertaken to establish the effect and impact of the governance indicators namely: Safety and 
Rule of Law; Participation and Human Rights; Sustainable Economic Opportunities and 
Human Development: and the Flow of Foreign Development Aid in Sub-Saharan Africa.  
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Table 4.14 Coefficients for Governance Indicators - Dependent Variable: Foreign 
Development Aid 




Constant 2179.9 459.191  4.747*** 0.0000 
Safety and Rule of law -65.962 12.461 -1.343 -5.294*** 0.0000 
Participation 25.978 7.585 0.587 3.425*** 0.0010 
Sustainable Economic opportunities 50.542 13.691 1.161 3.692*** 0.0000 
Human Development -23.329 13.469 -0.42 -1.732* 0.0880 
R2 0.379;     
F test 10.232;     
Prob > F 0.0000     
Note: *** and * denotes significance at 1% and 10% respectively  
Table 4.14 above shows that there is a R2 value of 0.379 which means that the proportion of the 
Flow of Foreign Development Aid that can be explained by all the governance indicators, 
namely, Safety and Rule of Law; Participation and Human Rights; Sustainable Economic 
Opportunities and Human Development, is 37.9%. The R-squared percentage is only 37.9% 
because there could be numerous other factors and issues that have an effect on the Flow of 
Foreign Development Aid to countries in Sub-Saharan Africa besides the four governance 
indicators. The table above also shows that the independent variables statistically and 
significantly predict the dependent variable, F (4, 67) = 10.232, p=0.000 which is p<0.05. 
Hence these results entail that the data for this regression model is robust and a good fit. 
The table above shows that the constant had a p-value of 0.000, which was less than 0.05, 
entailing that all the governance indicators (Safety and Rule of Law; Participation and Human 
Rights; Sustainable Economic Opportunities and Human Development) combined have a 
statistically significant impact on the Flow of Foreign Development Aid in Sub-Saharan 
African countries.  
According to the table 4.15 above the beta value for Safety and Rule of Law (β= -1.343; p<0.05) 
was negative and statistically significant which means that Safety and Rule of Law indicators 
have a negative effect on the Flow of Foreign Development Aid in Sub-Saharan African 
countries. Furthermore, the B-coefficient was -65.962 which entails that an increase in the 
Safety and Rule of Law indicators like rule of law, accountability, personal safety and national 
security by one unit could lead to a decrease in the Flow of Foreign Development Aid in Sub-
Saharan Africa by US$65.962 million per year. This could be because most Foreign 
Development Aid in Sub-Saharan Africa is directed towards addressing safety and rule of law 
issues for example funding of programs and projects that enhance rule of law, accountability, 
personal safety and national security. Therefore, an increase or improvement in a country’s rule 
of law, accountability, personal safety and national security could also lead to a reduction in 
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the Flow of Foreign Development Aid that addressed safety and rule of law issues/programs or 
projects. This in turn would also reduce the total amount of Foreign Development Aid to that 
country as well. However, these results are in line with Li and Resnick (2003) believe that an 
improvement in safety and rule of law in the host country has a negative impact on FDI inflows 
as compared to those with undesirable safety and rule of law levels who use authoritarian means 
to repress workers unions, provision of a lower cost work force, entry deals, as well as operation 
affordance. On the other hand, they are contrary to Jensen (2013) and Ahlquist (2016) who 
argue that more democratic countries attract more FDI than authoritarian countries because 
democracies tend to reduce the political risks of nationalization and expropriation and increase 
the credibility of the host country for foreign investors. 
Furthermore, the table above also shows that the beta value for Participation and Human Rights 
(β= 0.587; p<0.05) was positive and statistically significant which means that Participation and 
Human Rights indicators have a positive effect on the Flow of Foreign Development Aid in 
Sub-Saharan African countries. Additionally, the B-coefficient was 25.978 which entails that a 
single score improvement in Participation and Human Rights indicators like political 
participation, human rights and gender issues could lead to an increase in the Flow of Foreign 
Development Aid in Sub-Saharan Africa by US$25.978 million per year. This is because some 
governments of donor countries sanction human rights violations by reducing foreign aid, and 
reward those with good human rights and free political participation with higher Flow of 
Foreign Development Aid (Lebovic and Voeten, 2009: Nielsen, 2013). These findings are also 
in line with Jensen (2013) who states that failure by donors, to apply conditionality in inducing 
political and institutional reforms in recipient countries resulted in the introduction of ex-post 
selectivity whereby more foreign development aid is allocated to countries with a proven track 
record of ownership and commitment towards comprehensive reform and good governance. 
However, the findings are contrary to some scholars, such as Alesina and Dollar (2010) and 
Neumayer (2013), who argue that donor governments prioritize geostrategic or economic 
considerations over human rights that it is unlikely that aid workers will systematically punish 
beneficiary governments for violations human rights. 
Table 4.15 above also show that the beta value for Sustainable Economic Opportunities 
indicators (β= 1.161; p<0.05) was positive and statistically significant which means that 
Sustainable Economic Opportunities indicators have a positive effect on the Flow of Foreign 
Development Aid in Sub-Saharan African countries. Moreover, the B-coefficient was 50.542 
which entails that an increase in Sustainable Economic Opportunities indicators by one score 
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could lead to an increase in the Flow of Foreign Development Aid in Sub-Saharan Africa by 
US$50.542 million per year. This could be because that donor governments prioritize economic 
considerations (Alesina and Dollar, 2010; Neumayer, 2013). These findings are also agreed to 
by Daude and Stein (2017) who believe that unpredictable policies, excessive regulatory burden 
and lack of commitment of the Government to prevent the flow of FDI. Moreover, Gani (2017) 
adds that improving the control of corruption, regulatory quality and the efficiency of 
government has a positive effect on the entry of FDI. 
 
The table above also shows that the beta value for Human Development (β= -1.343) was 
negative, but, its p-value was 0.088 (p>0.05) which means that the results are statistically 
insignificant. Therefore, these findings show that Human Development indicators like the state 
of a country’s welfare, education and health sector do not have an effect or impact on the Flow 
of Foreign Development Aid in Sub-Saharan African countries. 
Therefore, these findings entail that the combined effect of all the governance indicators could 
lead to a positive inflow of over US$2.179 billion per year Foreign Development Aid to Sub-
Saharan Africa. Furthermore, it was also noted that only Participation and Human Rights as 
well as Sustainable Economic Opportunities indicators as individual governance indicators 
have a positive effect or impact on the Flow of Foreign Development Aid in Sub-Saharan 
African countries, with Sustainable Economic Opportunities indicators having the most 
individual effect (US$50.542 million per year) on Foreign Development Aid flow.  
However, Safety and Rule of Law indicators were discovered to have a negative effect on the 
Flow of Foreign Development Aid in Sub-Saharan African countries. On the other hand, the 
analysis also noted that Human Development indicators do not have an effect or impact on the 
Flow of Foreign Development Aid in Sub-Saharan African countries. 
4.10 Regression Analysis - Overall Governance Scores 
The results of the regression analysis undertaken to establish the effect and impact of the overall 
governance score on the Flow of Foreign Development Aid in Sub-Saharan Africa are discussed 
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Table 4.15 Coefficients for Overall Governance Scores 
Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients 
T Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
1 
(Constant) 795.798 365.060  2.180 .033 
Overall Governance -1.702 6.157 -.033 -.276 .783 
a. Dependent Variable: Foreign Development Aid; R2=0.033; F=0.076; P=0.783 
According to table 4.15 above there is a R2 value of 0.001 which means that the proportion of 
variance in the Flow of Foreign Development Aid that can be explained by a country’s Overall 
Governance score is only 3.3%. Furthermore, the table above shows that the beta value for 
Overall Governance score (β= -0.033) was negative, whilst, the p-value was 0.783 (p>0.05) 
which means that the results are statistically insignificant. Consequently, these findings show 
that a country’s Overall Governance score does not have an effect or impact on the Flow of 
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CHAPTER FIVE  
RESEARCH CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter analysed and discussed the results and findings from the secondary data 
which addressed the governance indicators in Sub-Saharan Africa for 2010 to 2015 according 
to IIAG as well as their Foreign Development Aid flow during the same period according to 
OECD and World Bank statistics. This chapter shall provide the conclusions for this study 
brought about from the research findings, analysis and discussion in the previous chapter. These 
conclusions shall address the research questions of this study that were proposed in the first 
chapter.  
5.2 Summary of Findings 
The study established that South Africa, Mozambique, Malawi, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Angola 
and Madagascar are the countries ranked as receiving the most foreign development aid whilst 
those that received the least foreign development aid flow were Botswana, Namibia, Mauritius, 
Lesotho and Swaziland. However, foreign development aid flow for South Africa, Mauritius 
and Namibia was on a downward trend during the 2010 to 2015 period but it was on an upward 
trend for Angola, Malawi and Zimbabwe. 
 
Furthermore, in terms of Overall Governance the countries ranked as the highest were 
Mauritius, Botswana, South Africa and Namibia whilst the countries that had average Overall 
Governance scores which were the lowest were Swaziland, Madagascar, Zimbabwe and 
Angola. On the contrary, the Overall Governance scores for Botswana, Malawi and 
Mozambique declined the most during the period whilst Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe 
improved the most throughout the same period. 
 
According to IIAG (2016) in terms of Safety and Rule of Law the countries ranked the best 
were Botswana, Mauritius, Namibia, South Africa and Zambia whilst those ranked as the worst 
were Madagascar, Angola and Zimbabwe. However, the Safety and Rule of Law indicator 
scores for Madagascar and Zimbabwe seem to have improved the most whilst those for 
Botswana, Malawi, Mauritius and Mozambique have been on a downward trend during the 
2010-2015 period. 
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Moreover, in terms of Participation and Human Rights the countries ranked as the best were 
Mauritius, Namibia, South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho and Malawi whilst those ranked as 
having the worst Participation and Human Rights were Zimbabwe, Angola and Swaziland. 
However, the Participation and Human Rights scores for Madagascar, Namibia and Zimbabwe 
improved whilst those for Angola, Botswana and Swaziland throughout the period. 
 
The study also established that in terms of Sustainable Economic opportunity the countries 
ranked as the best were Mauritius, South Africa, Botswana and Namibia whilst the rest of the 
other countries had average scores which were below half (50/100) with the worst being 
Madagascar, Angola and Zimbabwe. Conversely, the Sustainable Economic opportunity scores 
for Namibia, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe seem to have improved whilst those for 
Madagascar, Malawi and Angola deteriorated the most during the 2010-2015 period. 
 
Furthermore, it was also noted that Mauritius, Botswana, South Africa, Namibia and Swaziland 
in terms of Human Development were the countries ranked as the best whilst Mozambique, 
Madagascar and Angola had the worst Human Development average scores for the 2010-2015 
period. On the other hand, the Human Development scores for Angola, Zambia and Zimbabwe 
were the ones which improved the most whilst those for Madagascar and Mozambique declined 
the most during the 2010-2015 period. 
5.2.1 Regression Analysis Results 
The regression analysis results show that the combined effect of all the governance indicators 
led to an increase in the inflow of Foreign Development Aid of over US$2.179 billion per year 
in Sub-Saharan Africa. This is in line with the conceptual framework which was proposed in 
Chapter 2 and also illustrated with the regression analysis results in the figure 5.1 below. 
Furthermore, it was also noted that only Participation and Human Rights indicators as well as 
Sustainable Economic Opportunities indicators as individual governance indicators have 
positive effect or impact on the Flow of Foreign Development Aid in Sub-Saharan African 
countries, with Sustainable Economic Opportunities indicators having the most individual 
effect (US$50.542 million per year) on Foreign Development Aid flow. Furthermore, this is in 
line with the conceptual framework which was proposed in Chapter 2 and illustrated with the 
regression analysis results in the figure 5.1 below. 
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However, Safety and Rule of Law indicators were discovered to have a negative effect on the 
Flow of Foreign Development Aid in Sub-Saharan African countries. Whilst it was also noted 
that Human Development indicators do not have an effect or impact on the Flow of Foreign 
Development Aid in Sub-Saharan African countries. Moreover, though the results show a 
negative effect for Safety and Rule of Law the impact was still noted to be statistically 
significant at p<0.05. Therefore, this is in line with the conceptual framework which was 
proposed in Chapter 2 and also illustrated with the regression analysis results in the figure 5.1 
below. On the other hand, Human Development indicators do not have an effect or impact on 
the Flow of Foreign Development Aid in Sub-Saharan African countries which is contrary to 
the conceptual framework which was proposed in Chapter 2 and also illustrated with the 
regression analysis results in the figure 5.1 below.  
The findings also showed that a country’s Overall Governance score does not have an effect or 
impact on the Flow of Foreign Development Aid in Sub-Saharan African countries. This 
unfortunately is contrary to the conceptual framework which was proposed in chapter 2 and 
also illustrated in the figure 5.1 below with the regression analysis results. 
Figure 5.1 Conceptual Framework showing Regression Analysis Results 
 
Source: Researcher and study results from regression analysis (2017) 
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5.3 Conclusions 
5.3.1 Is the overall governance quality rating important in determining the flow of foreign 
aid to developing countries in sub-Saharan Africa? 
The correlation and regression analysis results showed that the overall governance quality 
rating was not important in determining the flow of foreign aid to developing countries in sub-
Saharan Africa. The analyses showed that there was no statistical significant relationship 
between overall governance quality rating and the flow of foreign aid to developing countries 
in sub-Saharan Africa nor did the overall governance quality rating a statistical significant effect 
on the flow of foreign aid to developing countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Furthermore, one can 
note that the only countries with a high overall governance quality rating that also had a high 
flow of foreign aid were South Africa and Zambia. 
 
On the other hand, the regression analysis results showed that the combined effect of all the 
governance indicators has a statistical significant effect on the flow of foreign aid to developing 
countries in sub-Saharan Africa. The study established that all the governance indicators 
combined could lead to a positive inflow of over US$2.179 billion per year Foreign 
Development Aid to Sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
5.3.2 What impact does each of the governance indicators have on the flow of foreign aid 
to developing nations in sub-Saharan Africa? 
According to the regression analysis tests only Participation and Human Rights indicators as 
well as Sustainable Economic Opportunities indicators have a positive effect or impact on the 
Flow of Foreign Development Aid in Sub-Saharan African countries, with Sustainable 
Economic Opportunities indicators having the highest impact (average of US$50.542 million 
per year) on Foreign Development Aid flow whilst Participation and Human Rights indicators’ 
impact was an average of US$50.542 million per year.  
However, Safety and Rule of Law indicators were discovered to have a negative effect on the 
Flow of Foreign Development Aid in Sub-Saharan African countries decreasing by an average 
of US$65.962 million per year. Furthermore, it was also established that Human Development 
indicators do not have an effect or impact on the Flow of Foreign Development Aid in Sub-
Saharan African countries. 
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On the other hand, the regression analysis results showed that the combined effect of all the 
governance indicators has a statistical significant effect on the flow of foreign aid to developing 
countries in sub-Saharan Africa. The study established that all the governance indicators 
combined could lead to a positive inflow of over US$2.179 billion per year Foreign 
Development Aid to Sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
5.4 Policy Implications of the Findings 
Given the results of the study summarised above, it is essential for Sub-Saharan African 
countries to revisit their governance structures and policies to attract foreign development aid. 
Specifically, it is essential for countries to implement policies that promote Safety and Rule of 
Law as well as Human Development if they are to attract more foreign development aid which 
is a significant source of finance for development especially in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
It is evident from the results of the study that donor agencies allocate most of their funding to 
governments that are more accountable and that respect the rule of law, personal safety of 
citizens and national security. It is therefore important for governments in Sub-Saharan Africa 
to implement national policies and government systems that promote these aspects. 
Furthermore, most donors are interested in funding human development projects such as 
welfare, education and health. It is therefore important for governments in Sub-Saharan Africa 
to implement economic policies that foster human development if they are to tap into this very 
essential source of development finance. 
5.5 Recommendations for future research 
The research was focused on Good governance, using IIAG indicators, as key to the flow of 
foreign development aid: sub-Saharan Africa perspective. Furthermore, the regression analysis 
also established that the proportion of the Flow of Foreign Development Aid that can be 
explained by all the governance indicators, namely, Safety and Rule of Law; Participation and 
Human Rights; Sustainable Economic Opportunities and Human Development, is 37.9%. 
Hence the researcher recommends that a study be done to determine the other factors and/or 
indicators used by the funding agencies in determining allocations. The literature in this area is 
limited particularly from the Sub-Saharan Africa perspective.  
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1 – IIAG 2010 Annual Assessment 
 
Appendix 2 – IIAG 2011 Annual Assessment 
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Appendix 3 – IIAG 2012 Annual Assessment 
 
Appendix 4 – IIAG 2013 Annual Assessment 
 
Appendix 5 – IIAG 2014 Annual Assessment 
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Appendix 6 – IIAG 2015 Annual Assessment 
 
Appendix 7 - Foreign Development Aid for Sub-Saharan countries (2010-2015) 
 
 
 
